dark-memory-mcp MCP Server Security Report
Persistent memory + vibe-loop engine for AI agents. Single Go binary, SQLite-backed, stdio MCP.
Run it securely
Run it through Canopii Gateway — policy enforcement, audit trail, and per-user attribution on every call.
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Claim this server- mediumNo install/post-install scripts — runs postinstall
The short answer
- Is dark-memory-mcp safe to use?
- dark-memory-mcp scores 63/100 (grade C) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No install/post-install scripts. It passes 13 of the 24 controls that apply to it.
- What security issues does dark-memory-mcp have?
- dark-memory-mcp fails 1 control: No install/post-install scripts. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
- How reliable is the security score for dark-memory-mcp?
- We could evaluate 84% of the controls that apply to dark-memory-mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
- How was dark-memory-mcp scored?
- Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Security controlslatest scored version v4.0.0-alpha.32
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Security controlslatest scored version v4.0.0-alpha.32
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails
- Not checkedIndirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno tools extracted
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
- Not checkedStrict JSON Schema Enforcementno tool schemas found
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
- Not checkedUser-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno tools extracted
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
- N/ATool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
Application Security Checks
- FailNo install/post-install scriptsguardruns postinstall
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time. How many servers fail this?
Fix: Remove preinstall/install/postinstall scripts, or document and minimize them.
- WarnCredentials sourced from environmentno env-based config detected
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
Fix: Read credentials from environment variables or a secret manager.
- WarnDependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).
- WarnEstablished maintainersingle maintainer
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Fix: Publish under an established account/org; add multiple maintainers.
- WarnDeclares a licenseno recognized license
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
Fix: Add a recognized SPDX license (MIT, Apache-2.0, …).
- WarnHas a security policyno security policy
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.
- PassNo command-injection sinksguardno sinks found
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
- PassNo dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
- PassNo path traversalguardno sinks found
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
- PassNo SSRF sinksguardno sinks found
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
- PassNo unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
- PassNo committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
- PassNo known-vulnerable dependencies1 runtime deps, no known CVEs
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
- PassPackage name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
- PassPublished with provenancepublished with provenance
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
- PassActively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
- PassRepository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
- PassAdoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
- Not checkedSigned releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
Transport & Trust Model
- WarnExecution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.
- PassNetwork Exposureno bind-all detected
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
- N/ATransport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
- N/AIAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
- N/ALive Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
- N/AAuthentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.
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[](https://index.canopii.dev/server/io.github.Opita-Code/dark-memory-mcp)<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/io.github.Opita-Code/dark-memory-mcp"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/io.github.Opita-Code/dark-memory-mcp" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>Versions
| Version | Score | Status | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| v4.0.0-alpha.32latest | 63C | scored | 10/15/2026 |
| v4.0.0-alpha.31 | 65C | scored | 10/9/2026 |
| v2.20.0 | 65C | scored | 8/21/2026 |
| v2.19.1 | 65C | scored | 8/18/2026 |
| v2.13.0 | 65C | scored | 8/10/2026 |
| v2.11.1 | 65C | scored | 8/8/2026 |
| v2.11.1-alpha | 64C | scored | 8/5/2026 |
| v2.11.0 | 65C | scored | 8/4/2026 |
| v2.9.3-alpha | 65C | scored | 8/3/2026 |
| v2.8.0-alpha | 65C | scored | 7/29/2026 |
| v2.5.2 | 64C | scored | 7/28/2026 |
Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.