Is mailfathom safe to use?

mailfathom scores 91/100 (grade A) on the Canopii Trust Index — strong posture. It passes 15 of the 22 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.

How reliable is the security score for mailfathom?

We could evaluate 90% of the controls that apply to mailfathom. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.

How was mailfathom scored?

Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

mailfathom MCP Server Security Report

io.github.Krzysztof318/mailfathom

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91A

Security Trust Score

Grade A · Strong posture

Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 90%latest v0.6.0 Repository

Declared MCP capabilities

ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

Host io.github.Krzysztof318/mailfathom in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

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The short answer

Is mailfathom safe to use?: mailfathom scores 91/100 (grade A) on the Canopii Trust Index — strong posture. It passes 15 of the 22 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for mailfathom?: We could evaluate 90% of the controls that apply to mailfathom. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was mailfathom scored?: Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

Reputation6stars0forks102open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version v0.6.0

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

Pass
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
Pass
Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Pass
User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
N/A
Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

Warn
No SSRF sinksguard2 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
docfx/template/public/main.js:86docfx/template/public/main.js:186
Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
Warn
Credentials sourced from environmentno env-based config detected
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
Fix: Read credentials from environment variables or a secret manager.
Warn
Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).
Warn
Adoption & popularitylimited adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.
Pass
No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
Pass
No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
Pass
No path traversalguardno sinks found
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
Pass
No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
Pass
No committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
Pass
Actively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
Pass
Repository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
Pass
Declares a licenseApache-2.0
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
Pass
Has a security policySECURITY.md present
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Not checked
No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
Not checked
Signed releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
N/A
No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
N/A
Package name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
N/A
Published with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
N/A
Established maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

Warn
Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.
Pass
Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
Pass
IAM / Authentication ScopingOAuth / PRM handling detected
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
Pass
Execution Sandboxingcontainerized
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
N/A
Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
N/A
Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

Version	Score	Status	Published
v0.6.0latest	91A	scored	8/14/2026

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.