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gomodel MCP Server Security Report

io.github.ENTERPILOT/gomodel

Self-hosted gateway aggregating upstream MCP servers behind one authenticated HTTP endpoint.

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest v0.1.103 Repository Publisher-verified
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

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The short answer

Is gomodel safe to use?
gomodel scores 88/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 17 of the 22 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for gomodel?
We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to gomodel. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was gomodel scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation1.2kstars113forks81open issues3d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version v0.1.103

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    In-Session Definition Integrityguardno call-gated or call-time tool definition changes

    Tool and prompt definitions stay fixed during a session — they don't change after a few calls, which is how runtime-gated rug-pulls slip past one-time review.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard38 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    web/dashboard/src/lib/components/molecules/searchSelectLogic.js:47web/dashboard/src/lib/stores/accessScope.js:27web/dashboard/src/lib/stores/accessScope.js:71web/dashboard/src/lib/stores/external-auth.js:7

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard2 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    web/dashboard/src/lib/api/client.js:25web/dashboard/src/lib/stores/version.svelte.js:98

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies18 of 208 runtime deps vulnerable; worst critical

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    github.com/yuin/[email protected] — GO-2026-5320golang.org/x/[email protected] — GHSA-3vm4-22fp-5rfmgolang.org/x/[email protected] — GHSA-45gg-vh54-h5m9golang.org/x/[email protected] — GHSA-45x7-px36-x8w8

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    No Token Passthroughguardno HTTP transport

    The client's token is never forwarded to downstream APIs — the server obtains its own, correctly-scoped credential instead.

  • N/A
    DNS-Rebinding Protectionno HTTP transport

    HTTP endpoints reject requests carrying an unlisted Origin, so a malicious web page can't drive the server through the user's browser.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
v0.1.103latest88Bscored
v0.1.10288Bscored
v0.1.10188Bscored
v0.1.10088Bscored
v0.1.9988Bscored
v0.1.9886Bscored
v0.1.9788Bscored
v0.1.9688Bscored
v0.1.9586Bscored
v0.1.9486Bscored
v0.1.9388Bscored
v0.1.9288Bscored
v0.1.9188Bscored
v0.1.9088Bscored
v0.1.8988Bscored
v0.1.8786Bscored
v0.1.8688Bscored
v0.1.8488Bscored
v0.1.8386Bscored
v0.1.8288Bscored
v0.1.8188Bscored
v0.1.8088Bscored
v0.1.7986Bscored
v0.1.7786Bscored
v0.1.7616Fscored
v0.1.7588Bscored
v0.1.7488Bscored
v0.1.7386Bscored
v0.1.7088Bscored
v0.1.6986Bscored
v0.1.6888Bscored
v0.1.6788Bscored
v0.1.6688Bscored
v0.1.6586Bscored
v0.1.6486Bscored
v0.1.6388Bscored
v0.1.6286Bscored
v0.1.6086Bscored
v0.1.5986Bscored
v0.1.5888Bscored
v0.1.5686Bscored
v0.1.5588Bscored
v0.1.5488Bscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.