Is aither-adk safe to use?

aither-adk scores 11/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 3 confirmed security failures that cap its score: No command-injection sinks, No dynamic code execution and No unsafe deserialization. It passes 7 of the 24 controls that apply to it.

What security issues does aither-adk have?

aither-adk fails 3 controls: No command-injection sinks, No dynamic code execution and No unsafe deserialization. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.

How reliable is the security score for aither-adk?

We could evaluate 77% of the controls that apply to aither-adk. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.

How was aither-adk scored?

Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

aither-adk MCP Server Security Report

io.github.Aitherium/aither-adk

Agent runtime with typed memory, knowledge and code graphs, plus file and web tools

11F

Security Trust Score

Grade F · Serious issues

Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 77%latest v3.0.5 Repository

Declared MCP capabilities

ToolsResources

Run it securely

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

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3 issues capping this score

criticalNo command-injection sinks — 4 occurrences
criticalNo dynamic code execution — 7 occurrences
highNo unsafe deserialization — 4 occurrences

The short answer

Is aither-adk safe to use?: aither-adk scores 11/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 3 confirmed security failures that cap its score: No command-injection sinks, No dynamic code execution and No unsafe deserialization. It passes 7 of the 24 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does aither-adk have?: aither-adk fails 3 controls: No command-injection sinks, No dynamic code execution and No unsafe deserialization. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for aither-adk?: We could evaluate 77% of the controls that apply to aither-adk. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was aither-adk scored?: Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

Reputation9stars1forks0open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version v3.0.5

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

Not checked
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno tools extracted
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
Not checked
Strict JSON Schema Enforcementno tool schemas found
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Not checked
User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno tools extracted
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
N/A
Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

Fail
No command-injection sinksguard4 occurrences
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?
adk/node/local_tools.py:249adk/ollama_setup.py:106adk/shell/cli.py:4868adk/shell/node/local_tools.py:249
Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.
Fail
No dynamic code executionguard7 occurrences
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution. How many servers fail this?
adk/agentdoc/_discover.py:172adk/agentdoc/_discover.py:257adk/agentdoc/_structured.py:1427adk/agentdoc/_visibility.py:203
Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.
Fail
No unsafe deserializationguard4 occurrences
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code. How many servers fail this?
adk/faculties/base.py:229adk/faculties/code_graph.py:1335adk/faculties/code_graph.py:2578adk/faculties/code_graph.py:2657
Fix: Use safe loaders (yaml.safe_load, JSON) on untrusted input.
Warn
No path traversalguard3 occurrences
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
adk/faculties/base.py:207adk/faculties/code_graph.py:215adk/server.py:1447
Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
Warn
No SSRF sinksguard52 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
adk/ambient.py:101adk/ambient.py:156adk/claude_model.py:66adk/claude_runner.py:858
Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
Warn
Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).
Warn
Established maintainerrecently published
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Fix: Publish under an established account/org; add multiple maintainers.
Warn
Declares a licenseno recognized license
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
Fix: Add a recognized SPDX license (MIT, Apache-2.0, …).
Warn
Has a security policyno security policy
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.
Warn
Adoption & popularitylimited adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.
Pass
No committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
Pass
Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
Pass
No known-vulnerable dependencies1 runtime deps, no known CVEs
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
Pass
Package name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
Pass
Actively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
Pass
Repository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
Not checked
No install/post-install scriptsguardnot determinable from PyPI metadata
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
Not checked
Published with provenancenot determinable
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
Not checked
Signed releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

Transport & Trust Model

Warn
Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.
Pass
Execution Sandboxingcontainerized
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
N/A
Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
N/A
IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
N/A
Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
N/A
Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

Version	Score	Status	Published
v3.0.5latest	11F	scored	8/7/2026

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.