CanopiiCanopiiAll serversEnterprise →

google-play-mcp MCP Server Security Report

io.github.AgiMaulana/google-play-mcp

Google Play release lifecycle: tracks, testers, rollout, and Android Vitals.

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 77%latest vrefs/heads/main Repository Publisher-verified
Declared MCP capabilities
ToolsResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

Host io.github.AgiMaulana/google-play-mcp in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

Are you the maintainer?

Verify with GitHub to get alerted whenever AgiMaulana/GooglePlayConsoleMcp changes score — and claim the badge for your README.

Claim this server

The short answer

Is google-play-mcp safe to use?
google-play-mcp scores 80/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 12 of the 24 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for google-play-mcp?
We could evaluate 77% of the controls that apply to google-play-mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was google-play-mcp scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation6stars1forks2open issues4mo agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vrefs/heads/main

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Not checked
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno tools extracted

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Not checked
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementno tool schemas found

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Not checked
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno tools extracted

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Warn
    Established maintainerrecently published

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

    Fix: Publish under an established account/org; add multiple maintainers.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No path traversalguardno sinks found

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Pass
    No SSRF sinksguardno sinks found

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies1 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    Package name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Not checked
    No install/post-install scriptsguardnot determinable from PyPI metadata

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • Not checked
    Published with provenancenot determinable

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Embed this score

Add the live badge to your README — it updates automatically on every rescan.

Canopii Trust Score badge preview
markdown[![Canopii Trust Score](https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/io.github.AgiMaulana/google-play-mcp)](https://index.canopii.dev/server/io.github.AgiMaulana/google-play-mcp)
html<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/io.github.AgiMaulana/google-play-mcp"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/io.github.AgiMaulana/google-play-mcp" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>

Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vrefs/heads/mainlatest80Bscored
v0.5.080Bscored
v0.2.1—no repository

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.