Is Waggle-mcp safe to use?

Waggle-mcp scores 15/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No dynamic code execution. It passes 12 of the 24 controls that apply to it.

What security issues does Waggle-mcp have?

Waggle-mcp fails 1 control: No dynamic code execution. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.

How reliable is the security score for Waggle-mcp?

We could evaluate 73% of the controls that apply to Waggle-mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.

How was Waggle-mcp scored?

Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

Waggle-mcp MCP Server Security Report

io.github.Abhigyan-Shekhar/Waggle-mcp

Persistent graph-backed conversational memory for AI agents.

15F

Security Trust Score

Grade F · Serious issues

Tier 1 · Public sourceMedium confidence · 73%latest v0.1.8 Repository Publisher-verified

Declared MCP capabilities

ToolsResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

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1 issue capping this score

criticalNo dynamic code execution — 1 occurrence

The short answer

Is Waggle-mcp safe to use?: Waggle-mcp scores 15/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No dynamic code execution. It passes 12 of the 24 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does Waggle-mcp have?: Waggle-mcp fails 1 control: No dynamic code execution. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for Waggle-mcp?: We could evaluate 73% of the controls that apply to Waggle-mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was Waggle-mcp scored?: Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

Reputation34stars121forks169open issues18d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version v0.1.8

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

Pass
Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Not checked
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno tools extracted
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
Not checked
User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno tools extracted
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
N/A
Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

Fail
No dynamic code executionguard1 occurrence
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution. How many servers fail this?
src/rlm/environments/local_repl.py:524
Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.
Warn
No path traversalguard1 occurrence
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
apps/vscode-extension/scripts/validate-commands.js:157
Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
Warn
No SSRF sinksguard15 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
apps/mcp/graph-ui/src/App.jsx:690apps/mcp/graph-ui/src/lib/api.js:2apps/vscode-extension/src/commands.ts:266scripts/sync_github_labels.py:141
Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
Warn
No known-vulnerable dependencies5 of 91 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
@hono/[email protected] — GHSA-frvp-7c67-39w9[email protected] — GHSA-v422-hmwv-36x6[email protected] — GHSA-4c8g-83qw-93j6[email protected] — GHSA-7p8r-x3mc-p8w7
Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.
Pass
No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
Pass
No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
Pass
No committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
Pass
Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
Pass
Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Pass
Actively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
Pass
Repository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
Pass
Declares a licenseApache-2.0
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
Pass
Has a security policySECURITY.md present
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Pass
Adoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
Not checked
No install/post-install scriptsguardpypi metadata unavailable
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
Not checked
Package name not typosquattingguardpypi metadata unavailable
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
Not checked
Published with provenancepypi metadata unavailable
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
Not checked
Established maintainerpypi metadata unavailable
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Not checked
Signed releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

Transport & Trust Model

Warn
Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.
Pass
Execution Sandboxingcontainerized
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
N/A
Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
N/A
IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
N/A
Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
N/A
Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

Version	Score	Status	Published
v0.1.8latest	15F	scored	4/21/2026

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.