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io.apis/apis-io

io.apis/apis-io v1.3.0

Security Trust Score
Grade D · Weak posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceLow confidence · 25%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored D. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • Not checked
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementno source files

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Not checked
    In-Session Definition Integrityguardno source

    Tool and prompt definitions stay fixed during a session — they don't change after a few calls, which is how runtime-gated rug-pulls slip past one-time review.

Application Security Checks

  • Not checked
    No command-injection sinksguardno source

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Not checked
    No dynamic code executionguardno source

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Not checked
    No path traversalguardno source

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Not checked
    No SSRF sinksguardno source

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Not checked
    No unsafe deserializationguardno source

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Not checked
    No committed secretsguardno source

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Not checked
    Credentials sourced from environmentno source files

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Not checked
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no source files

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Not checked
    Actively maintainedGitHub API unavailable

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Not checked
    Repository not archivedguardGitHub API unavailable

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Not checked
    Declares a licenseGitHub API unavailable

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Not checked
    Has a security policyno source files

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • Not checked
    Adoption & popularityno adoption signal

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • N/A
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno dependencies to scan

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Not checked
    No Token Passthroughguardno source

    The client's token is never forwarded to downstream APIs — the server obtains its own, correctly-scoped credential instead.

  • Not checked
    DNS-Rebinding Protectionno source to inspect

    HTTP endpoints reject requests carrying an unlisted Origin, so a malicious web page can't drive the server through the user's browser.

  • Not checked
    Execution Sandboxingno source files

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Not checked
    Network Exposureno source files

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (141)

get_vcget_apiget_tagresolvefind_mcpfind_vcsget_areaget_listfind_apisfind_tagsmy_checksfind_areasfind_plansfind_rulesget_cohortget_estateget_pricesget_regionlist_listsreport_gapadd_to_listcreate_listdelete_listfind_agentsfind_arazzofind_finopsfind_scopesfind_skillsget_countryget_openapisave_searchstory_leadscheck_statuscohort_statscompany_gapsexport_stackfind_cohortsfind_estatesfind_graphqlfind_json_ldfind_postmanfind_ratingsfind_regionsgap_analysisget_industryget_providerlist_watchesmy_workspacevc_portfolioclaim_listingcohort_scorescorrect_factsfind_channelsfind_examplesfind_openapisfind_securityget_extensionget_tag_grouprequest_checkwatch_listingwhats_changedapis_io_searchcohort_historyexport_datasetfind_apis_jsonfind_artifactsfind_asyncapisfind_countriesfind_investorsfind_providersget_capabilityget_regulationregister_agentset_visibilitysimulate_fixestag_group_tagswhat_can_i_fixcohort_failurescohort_rankingscompare_cohortsdispute_findingenrich_providerfind_extensionsfind_industriesfind_operationsfind_tag_groupsmatch_providersreadiness_gatesrecommend_stacksubmit_artifactsubmit_feedbackunwatch_listingfind_collectionsfind_rate_limitsfind_regulationsget_area_leadersrun_saved_searchcompare_providersfind_capabilitiesfind_json_schemasfind_similar_apisgenerate_artifactget_api_artifactsget_provider_apisget_rating_rubricinsights_adoptioninsights_overviewreport_correctionfind_rating_moversget_provider_toolsget_rating_historyget_region_leaderscohort_capabilitiesdelete_saved_searchget_agent_readinessget_company_insightget_country_leadersget_playground_apisget_provider_estateget_provider_facetsget_provider_ratingget_provider_schemainsights_dimensionsinsights_industrieslist_saved_searchesfind_agent_readinessfind_json_structuresget_capability_edgesget_industry_leaderssaved_search_net_newdeprecated_operationsfind_company_insightsget_provider_evidenceindustry_gap_analysisfind_similar_providersget_provider_artifactsget_provider_onboardingget_provider_operationsget_provider_capabilitiesagent_readiness_dimensionsget_provider_business_capabilities
io.apis/apis-io v1.3.0 — 40/100 · Canopii Trust Index