CanopiiCanopiiAll serversEnterprise →

model-compose MCP Server Security Report

hanyeol/model-compose

Deploy production-ready AI services in minutes. One YAML file for agents, RAG pipelines, and MCP servers — run anywhere. Inspired by docker-compose.

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceMedium confidence · 73%latest vmain@4349b94 Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ToolsResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

Host hanyeol/model-compose in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

Are you the maintainer?

Verify with GitHub to get alerted whenever hanyeol/model-compose changes score — and claim the badge for your README.

Claim this server

The short answer

Is model-compose safe to use?
model-compose scores 80/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 13 of the 20 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for model-compose?
We could evaluate 73% of the controls that apply to model-compose. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was model-compose scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation76stars4forks1open issues37d agolast commit1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@4349b94

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Not checked
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno tools extracted

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Not checked
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementno tool schemas found

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Not checked
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno tools extracted

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No path traversalguardno sinks found

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Pass
    No SSRF sinksguardno sinks found

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Embed this score

Add the live badge to your README — it updates automatically on every rescan.

Canopii Trust Score badge preview
markdown[![Canopii Trust Score](https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/hanyeol/model-compose)](https://index.canopii.dev/server/hanyeol/model-compose)
html<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/hanyeol/model-compose"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/hanyeol/model-compose" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>

Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@d925d3d80Bscored
vmain@2ef9edf80Bscored
vmain@91a0a1080Bscored
vmain@c41ce5d80Bscored
vmain@3125bd580Bscored
vmain@911552b80Bscored
vmain@46f883a80Bscored
vmain@6bfac0f80Bscored
vmain@1c514e380Bscored
vmain@a525e3280Bscored
vmain@e591ec380Bscored
vmain@6980f8b80Bscored
vmain@a1daa5780Bscored
vmain@0d165b280Bscored
vmain@da55d6d80Bscored
vmain@08d409080Bscored
vmain@c81f03580Bscored
vmain@f0743a380Bscored
vmain@985048380Bscored
vmain@384ae9580Bscored
vmain@bcf935d80Bscored
vmain@fe2f41880Bscored
vmain@e7ba03c80Bscored
vmain@6299a3f80Bscored
vmain@74d86f980Bscored
vmain@ce0af6880Bscored
vmain@00276e180Bscored
vmain@50c0db980Bscored
vmain@33a4b8280Bscored
vmain@78d4d2080Bscored
vmain@61ed37480Bscored
vmain@cbf518980Bscored
vmain@4349b94latest80Bscored
vmain@c90a0ae80Bscored
vmain@5ed98db80Bscored
vmain@1be8b8880Bscored
vmain@250f45c80Bscored
vmain@0551bbd80Bscored
vmain@ef0410380Bscored
vmain@a22f8f680Bscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.