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mcp-video-analyzer MCP Server Security Report

guimatheus92/mcp-video-analyzer

MCP server that turns any video — YouTube, Instagram, TikTok, Loom, X, Vimeo, direct URLs, local files — into transcripts, key frames, OCR text, and metadata for AI agents.

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest vmain@991d105 Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

Host guimatheus92/mcp-video-analyzer in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

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The short answer

Is mcp-video-analyzer safe to use?
mcp-video-analyzer scores 86/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 15 of the 21 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for mcp-video-analyzer?
We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to mcp-video-analyzer. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was mcp-video-analyzer scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation109stars23forks1open issues5d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@991d105

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No command-injection sinksguard1 occurrence (build/test paths only)

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

    scripts/verify-package.ts:17

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard21 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    src/cli.test.ts:111src/cli.test.ts:162src/processors/frame-extractor.ts:445src/processors/frame-extractor.ts:490

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard5 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    src/adapters/loom.adapter.ts:193src/adapters/loom.adapter.ts:285src/adapters/loom.adapter.ts:317src/adapters/twelvelabs.adapter.ts:264

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies280 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@991d105latest86Bscored
vmain@a4e158e86Bscored
vmain@e37c86482Bscored
vmain@898a17486Bscored
vmain@426880a86Bscored
vmain@10bfb4e86Bscored
vmain@686da2183Bscored
vmain@3528fd486Bscored
vmain@c32173482Bscored
vmain@9e476c082Bscored
vmain@541df5282Bscored
vmain@32973fa82Bscored
vmain@5ad5a7e82Bscored
vmain@feca0b782Bscored
vmain@589baca82Bscored
vmain@4dc152682Bscored
vmain@e684edf82Bscored
vmain@2b1cd0d84Bscored
vmain@b56d96684Bscored
vmain@aa7409b87Bscored
vmain@61dfc1784Bscored
vmain@47b1ed984Bscored
vmain@2f9c5a582Bscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.