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muster MCP Server Security Report

giantswarm/muster

MCP tool management and workflow proxy

Security Trust Score
Grade A · Strong posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest vmain@e534efa Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

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The short answer

Is muster safe to use?
muster scores 93/100 (grade A) on the Canopii Trust Index — strong posture. It passes 17 of the 21 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for muster?
We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to muster. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was muster scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation28stars9forks55open issues36d agolast commit1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@e534efa

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    Credentials sourced from environmentno env-based config detected

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

    Fix: Read credentials from environment variables or a secret manager.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies30 of 420 runtime deps vulnerable; worst critical

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    golang.org/x/[email protected] — GHSA-3vm4-22fp-5rfmgolang.org/x/[email protected] — GHSA-45gg-vh54-h5m9golang.org/x/[email protected] — GHSA-45x7-px36-x8w8golang.org/x/[email protected] — GHSA-5cgq-3rg8-m6cv

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No path traversalguardno sinks found

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Pass
    No SSRF sinksguardno sinks found

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseApache-2.0

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@a7fb0a793Ascored
vmain@7e341ac93Ascored
vmain@bf9b9b693Ascored
vmain@d7244a793Ascored
vmain@47ead1593Ascored
vmain@1d6eeab93Ascored
vmain@688af2193Ascored
vmain@2d36e5b93Ascored
vmain@57a310193Ascored
vmain@5ece2eb93Ascored
vmain@d3eb12c93Ascored
vmain@040827493Ascored
vmain@30916d893Ascored
vmain@6761f4093Ascored
vmain@4273a3493Ascored
vmain@1f8823593Ascored
vmain@1e2bb6893Ascored
vmain@cb97dc893Ascored
vmain@ece4f8993Ascored
vmain@d56945193Ascored
vmain@b251fe593Ascored
vmain@c33af1c93Ascored
vmain@8b010b593Ascored
vmain@1cb08a493Ascored
vmain@36c90d693Ascored
vmain@d51ebb893Ascored
vmain@14e6c6b93Ascored
vmain@25b267d93Ascored
vmain@a3ac43f93Ascored
vmain@e534efalatest93Ascored
vmain@c1cd22993Ascored
vmain@f9486d593Ascored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.