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Embody MCP Server Security Report

dylanroscover/Embody

MCP server for TouchDesigner — build, wire, and debug networks with AI. Plus git-diffable externalization.

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 76%latest vmain@a345295 Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ToolsResourcesPrompts

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Host dylanroscover/Embody in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

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The short answer

Is Embody safe to use?
Embody scores 80/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 11 of the 20 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for Embody?
We could evaluate 76% of the controls that apply to Embody. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was Embody scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation211stars10forks7open issues5d agolast commit2yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@a345295

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Not checked
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno tools extracted

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Not checked
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno tools extracted

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard89 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    dev/convoy/convoy_hostprobe.py:153dev/convoy/convoy_hoststore.py:1862dev/convoy/convoy_lan.py:610dev/convoy/convoy_platform.py:247

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard15 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    dev/convoy/convoy_hostprobe.py:135dev/convoy/manual_exit_proof.py:27dev/convoy/manual_exit_proof.py:44dev/convoy/test_convoy_hostapp.py:55

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@a345295latest80Bscored
vmain@00f6e7f15Fscored
vmain@ab3613a15Fscored
vmain@53132f615Fscored
vmain@1e8e39515Fscored
vmain@e45c17515Fscored
vmain@15d415f15Fscored
vmain@7b2ac1d15Fscored
vmain@d1b42a515Fscored
vmain@061275c13Fscored
vmain@d5c73ba13Fscored
vmain@29bf3de13Fscored
vmain@1ce314014Fscored
vmain@6c7ae3e15Fscored
vmain@9a47bf315Fscored
vmain@1e468f815Fscored
vmain@c4c230f15Fscored
vmain@8f30c9515Fscored
vmain@78e84fb80Bscored
vmain@a5025b412Fscored
vmain@5447dea12Fscored
vmain@76b43fc14Fscored
vmain@ba7066814Fscored
vmain@ebfa42113Fscored
vmain@45af4ff14Fscored
vmain@5a7f64f14Fscored
vmain@f470ea614Fscored
vmain@8ad709c39Fscored
vmain@162970c39Fscored
vmain@c80321d14Fscored
vmain@bdb692039Fscored
vmain@a0d1da280Bscored
vmain@ed49e3580Bscored
vmain@3445c4a80Bscored
vmain@8fe823480Bscored
vmain@fb5b5a380Bscored
vmain@74faf5280Bscored
vmain@fa600e280Bscored
vmain@d37481380Bscored
vmain@bb4745d80Bscored
vmain@a0e908a80Bscored
vmain@be6d89180Bscored
vmain@66e947880Bscored
vmain@2e7eee980Bscored
vmain@07e637715Fscored
vmain@6a7290715Fscored
vmain@e81800915Fscored
vmain@19875e315Fscored
vmain@16ca52c15Fscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.