immich-photo-manager MCP Server Security Report
📸🧹🗺️ MCP server for intelligent photo management with Immich — search, curate geographic albums, clean up libraries, and publish galleries
Run it securely
Run it through Canopii Gateway — policy enforcement, audit trail, and per-user attribution on every call.
Are you the maintainer?
Verify with GitHub to get alerted whenever drolosoft/immich-photo-manager changes score — and claim the badge for your README.
Claim this server- mediumNo over-broad / destructive tools — 1 over-broad tool(s)
The short answer
- Is immich-photo-manager safe to use?
- immich-photo-manager scores 63/100 (grade C) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No over-broad / destructive tools. It passes 13 of the 20 controls that apply to it.
- What security issues does immich-photo-manager have?
- immich-photo-manager fails 1 control: No over-broad / destructive tools. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
- How reliable is the security score for immich-photo-manager?
- We could evaluate 89% of the controls that apply to immich-photo-manager. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
- How was immich-photo-manager scored?
- Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Security controlslatest scored version vmain@0f5819c
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Security controlslatest scored version vmain@0f5819c
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails
- FailUser-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguard1 over-broad tool(s)
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval. How many servers fail this?
empty_trashFix: Scope tools narrowly; avoid arbitrary command execution and destructive defaults.
- WarnStrict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.
- PassIndirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
- N/ATool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
Application Security Checks
- WarnNo path traversalguard1 occurrence
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
test-lmstudio-mcp.py:23Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
- WarnNo SSRF sinksguard8 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
scripts/create_geographic_albums.py:78scripts/create_geographic_albums.py:85scripts/create_shared_links.py:29scripts/create_shared_links.py:37Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
- PassNo command-injection sinksguardno sinks found
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
- PassNo dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
- PassNo unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
- PassNo committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
- PassCredentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
- PassDependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
- PassActively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
- PassRepository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
- PassDeclares a licenseMIT
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
- PassHas a security policySECURITY.md present
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
- PassAdoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
- Not checkedNo known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
- Not checkedSigned releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
- N/ANo install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
- N/APackage name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
- N/APublished with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
- N/AEstablished maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Transport & Trust Model
- WarnExecution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.
- PassNetwork Exposureno bind-all detected
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
- N/ATransport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
- N/AIAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
- N/ALive Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
- N/AAuthentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.
Embed this score
Add the live badge to your README — it updates automatically on every rescan.
[](https://index.canopii.dev/server/drolosoft/immich-photo-manager)<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/drolosoft/immich-photo-manager"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/drolosoft/immich-photo-manager" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>Versions
| Version | Score | Status | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| vmain@0f5819clatest | 63C | scored | 7/27/2026 |
Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.