dnnyngyen/iron-manus-mcp vmain@16be8c0
This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.
- criticalNo command-injection sinks — 4 occurrences
- lowRepository not archived — repository archived
Security controls
Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Security controls
Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails
- PassIndirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
- PassStrict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
- PassUser-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
- N/ATool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
Application Security Checks
- FailNo command-injection sinksguard4 occurrences
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?
scripts/install.js:27scripts/install.js:45scripts/install.js:164scripts/update-security.js:33Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.
- FailRepository not archivedguardrepository archived
Archived repositories will never be patched. How many servers fail this?
Fix: Unarchive and maintain, or migrate to a maintained fork.
- WarnNo path traversalguard5 occurrences
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
src/core/api-registry.ts:1032src/core/graph-state-adapter.ts:135src/core/graph-state-adapter.ts:213src/core/graph-state-adapter.ts:254Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
- WarnNo known-vulnerable dependencies13 of 183 runtime deps vulnerable; worst critical
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
@modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] — GHSA-345p-7cg4-v4c7@modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] — GHSA-8r9q-7v3j-jr4g@modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] — GHSA-w48q-cv73-mx4w[email protected] — GHSA-v422-hmwv-36x6Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.
- PassNo dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
- PassNo SSRF sinksguardno sinks found
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
- PassNo unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
- PassNo committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
- PassCredentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
- PassDependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
- PassActively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
- PassDeclares a licenseMIT
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
- PassHas a security policySECURITY.md present
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
- PassAdoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
- Not checkedSigned releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
- N/ANo install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
- N/APackage name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
- N/APublished with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
- N/AEstablished maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Transport & Trust Model
- WarnNetwork Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.
- PassExecution Sandboxingcontainerized
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
- N/ATransport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
- N/AIAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
- N/ALive Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
- N/AAuthentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.