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dev.workers.mikeyang7789.cn-evidence-mcp-public/cn-evidence

dev.workers.mikeyang7789.cn-evidence-mcp-public/cn-evidence v0.1.2

Security Trust Score
Grade D · Weak posture
Tier 2 · Live endpointLow confidence · 25%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored D. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • Not checked
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementno source files

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Not checked
    In-Session Definition Integrityguardno source

    Tool and prompt definitions stay fixed during a session — they don't change after a few calls, which is how runtime-gated rug-pulls slip past one-time review.

Application Security Checks

  • Not checked
    No command-injection sinksguardno source

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Not checked
    No dynamic code executionguardno source

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Not checked
    No path traversalguardno source

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Not checked
    No SSRF sinksguardno source

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Not checked
    No unsafe deserializationguardno source

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Not checked
    No committed secretsguardno source

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Not checked
    Credentials sourced from environmentno source files

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Not checked
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no source files

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Not checked
    Actively maintainedno GitHub repository

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Not checked
    Repository not archivedguardno GitHub repository

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Not checked
    Declares a licenseno GitHub repository

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Not checked
    Has a security policyno source files

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • Not checked
    Adoption & popularityno adoption signal

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • N/A
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno dependencies to scan

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Not checked
    No Token Passthroughguardno source

    The client's token is never forwarded to downstream APIs — the server obtains its own, correctly-scoped credential instead.

  • Not checked
    DNS-Rebinding Protectionno source to inspect

    HTTP endpoints reject requests carrying an unlisted Origin, so a malicious web page can't drive the server through the user's browser.

  • Not checked
    Execution Sandboxingno source files

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Not checked
    Network Exposureno source files

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (68)

cn_data_v3_sinacn_data_v3_wechatcn_data_v3_app_listcn_data_v3_law_listcn_data_v3_bid_countcn_data_v3_tax_basiccn_data_v3_work_listcn_data_v3_app_detailcn_data_v3_bid_headercn_data_v3_tax_creditcn_data_v3_website_ipresolve_china_companycn_data_v3_company_tagcn_data_v3_honor_countcn_data_v3_media_countcn_data_v3_minapp_listcn_data_v3_news_headercn_data_v3_tax_overduecn_data_v3_website_seocn_data_v3_license_listcn_data_v3_website_techget_cn_data_tool_schemacn_data_v3_customs_countcn_data_v3_minapp_detailcn_data_v3_patent_headercn_data_v3_recruit_countcn_data_v3_software_listcn_data_v3_standard_listcn_data_v3_website_countcn_data_v3_company_detailcn_data_v3_judicial_countcn_data_v3_listed_companycn_data_v3_standard_countcn_data_v3_website_recordcn_data_v3_branch_org_listcn_data_v3_cases_info_listcn_data_v3_key_person_listcn_data_v3_register_headercn_data_v3_standard_detailcn_data_v3_website_modulescn_data_v3_court_trial_listcn_data_v3_patent_law_countcn_data_v3_shareholder_listcn_data_v3_application_countcn_data_v3_cases_info_detailcn_data_v3_certificate_countcn_data_v3_court_notice_listcn_data_v3_industrial_changecn_data_v3_patent_type_countcn_data_v3_promotion_keywordcn_data_v3_intellectual_countcn_data_v3_patent_apply_trendcn_data_v3_promotion_overviewcn_data_v3_business_risk_countcn_data_v3_court_notice_detailcn_data_v3_operation_exceptioncn_data_v3_tax_punishment_listcn_data_v3_certificate_overviewcn_data_v3_termination_overviewcn_data_v3_trademark_type_countcn_data_v3_trademark_apply_trendget_china_supplier_evidence_fullcn_data_v3_administrative_penaltycn_data_v3_trademark_status_countget_china_supplier_evidence_basiccn_data_v3_juridical_person_companycn_data_v3_patent_publication_trendcn_data_v3_trademark_register_trend