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knowl MCP Server Security Report

dat999zx/knowl

Persistent memory for Claude Code, Cursor and Codex. Facts are typed, sourced, and retired when they change. Local SQLite, no API keys.

Security Trust Score
Grade A · Strong posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest vmain@6d52e5a Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

Host dat999zx/knowl in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

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The short answer

Is knowl safe to use?
knowl scores 92/100 (grade A) on the Canopii Trust Index — strong posture. It passes 17 of the 21 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for knowl?
We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to knowl. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was knowl scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation92stars7forks3open issues2d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@6d52e5a

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard26 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    benchmarks/accuracy/src/collect.ts:109benchmarks/unassisted-capture/src/generate-codex.ts:36integrations/openclaw/src/engine.ts:19integrations/openclaw/src/index.ts:117

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard9 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    benchmarks/memoryagentbench/cli.ts:46benchmarks/memoryagentbench/mab/agentmemory_bench.py:48scripts/deprecate-legacy-versions.mjs:51scripts/research/enumerate-embedding-models.mjs:27

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies208 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseApache-2.0

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@6d52e5alatest92Ascored
vmain@8f982cf93Ascored
vmain@137fe6889Bscored
vmain@82dcd8189Bscored
vmain@c1fcc1789Bscored
vmain@c8dcab989Bscored
vmain@25ab1f389Bscored
vmain@9065ed189Bscored
vmain@f2252db89Bscored
vmain@2c3e37689Bscored
vmain@b90ca8389Bscored
vmain@8e16c5589Bscored
vmain@cf92eb189Bscored
vmain@78be24189Bscored
vmain@dc53f3e89Bscored
vmain@44737ea89Bscored
vmain@04b7a6292Ascored
vmain@13d35bd89Bscored
vmain@09adfe788Bscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.