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czlonkowski/n8n-mcp

czlonkowski/n8n-mcp vmain@e87d62b

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

1 issue capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks18 occurrences
Reputation23kstars3.6kforks58open issues2d agolast commit1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard18 occurrences

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    scripts/generate-release-notes.js:18src/community/community-node-service.ts:88src/community/community-node-service.ts:98src/database/database-adapter.ts:199

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard107 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    docker/parse-config.js:173scripts/extract-changelog.js:40scripts/generate-release-notes.js:51scripts/http-bridge.js:69

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard13 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    scripts/http-bridge.js:53scripts/mcp-http-client.js:57scripts/test-url-configuration.ts:121scripts/test-url-configuration.ts:130

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies42 of 1386 runtime deps vulnerable; worst critical

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    @anthropic-ai/[email protected] — GHSA-p7fg-763f-g4gf[email protected] — GHSA-w5hq-g745-h8pq@grpc/[email protected] — GHSA-5375-pq7m-f5r2@grpc/[email protected] — GHSA-99f4-grh7-6pcq

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (65)

mcpbodyrepoSlackownertitlen8n-mcpget_nodeadd_nodesoperationserverUrlGet PromptList Toolsnpm_readmeList Promptsdata_analystget_templatesearch_nodeswriter_agentRead Resourcefield-patternnode-categoryvalidate_nodevalue-patternList Resourcesn8n_diagnosticn8n_executionsresearch_agentFilesystem Toolai_agents_guiden8n_evaluationstoolDescriptionn8n skill (main)n8n_get_workflown8n_health_checksearch_templatesexact-field-matchn8n_test_workflowvalidate_workflowCalculate Shippingn8n_audit_instancen8n_list_workflowsn8n_manage_foldersResearch Specialistget_node_essentialsn8n_create_workflown8n_delete_workflown8n_deploy_templatetools_documentationn8n_autofix_workflown8n_manage_datatablen8n_validate_workflown8n_workflow_versions[MCP-TEST] Webhook GET[MCP-TEST] Webhook PUTn8n_manage_credentials[MCP-TEST] Webhook POSTai_summary_generated_atai_documentation_summaryn8n_list_available_toolsn8n_update_full_workflow[MCP-TEST] Webhook DELETEn8n skill (supporting file)n8n_update_partial_workflown8n Documentation MCP Server