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com.writerslogic.agents/writerslogic-agents

com.writerslogic.agents/writerslogic-agents v1.0.0

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceLow confidence · 24%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

2 issues capping this score
  • highTool descriptions free of injection markers — 1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)
  • mediumNo over-broad / destructive tools — 2 over-broad tool(s)

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Fail
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent. How many servers fail this?

    instruction-data-split — 'ignore previous' override

    Fix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.

  • Fail
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguard2 over-broad tool(s)

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval. How many servers fail this?

    migration-reversibilityshell-quote

    Fix: Scope tools narrowly; avoid arbitrary command execution and destructive defaults.

  • Not checked
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementno source files

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Not checked
    No command-injection sinksguardno source

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Not checked
    No dynamic code executionguardno source

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Not checked
    No path traversalguardno source

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Not checked
    No SSRF sinksguardno source

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Not checked
    No unsafe deserializationguardno source

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Not checked
    No committed secretsguardno source

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Not checked
    Credentials sourced from environmentno source files

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Not checked
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no source files

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Not checked
    Actively maintainedGitHub API unavailable

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Not checked
    Repository not archivedguardGitHub API unavailable

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Not checked
    Declares a licenseGitHub API unavailable

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Not checked
    Has a security policyno source files

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • Not checked
    Adoption & popularityno adoption signal

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • N/A
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno dependencies to scan

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Not checked
    Execution Sandboxingno source files

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Not checked
    Network Exposureno source files

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (262)

leaseid-kindallocatechecksumcoa-gateid-blockjwt-lintlot-pickchat-deepchat-fastcidr-mathcsp-auditdice-rolldoi-checkdst-checkpack-sizeprint-boxprorationsql-checkcarton-fitchess-moveclause-tagdispute-evinbox-polljwt-verifymesh-checkpath-rulesvin-decodeweb-searchchord-checkcover-claimcsv-dialectexif-reportform-findermagic-bytesmetar-parsemicro-batchminor-unitspolicy-gateredact-textregex-checkscore-stateshell-quotespdx-policywarm-memoryweek-numberbid-coveragecontext-packcontrast-fixcron-explaindedup-windowdom-skeletonfleet-memoryfont-convertgeo-distancegraphql-costhash-receiptheal-scraperhttp-outcomeiam-minimizeinbox-createlog-collapsemcp-tool-pinpage-capturepatch-anchorrecipe-scaleresult-cacherobots-checksemver-checkspend-ledgersvg-geometrytext-offsetstoken-bucketunion-branchunit-convertx509-inspectage-thresholdallergen-flagarxiv-to-codecash-roundingcausalRefereechat-standardcitation-spancra-readinesscsv-roundtripdeictic-checkexposure-calcfiscal-periodfont-coveragefont-face-csshedge-extractinvoice-auditlocale-numbermetered-priceopenapi-slicepage-contentsproperty-riskschema-compatschema-repairscreen-tokenssubtitle-lintsymbol-existstax-id-formatunicode-checkcitation-auditcors-preflightfont-glyph-svgformula-weightgeo-axis-checkgtin-hierarchyk8s-crosschecklockfile-mergemarket-sessionnegation-scopepackage-existsprint-estimateschema-witnessslot-intersectsolar-positionsyllable-counttranscribe-urlupdate-dialectwebhook-verifyappointment-fitcache-key-checkcalldata-decodediff-gatekeeperdoc-to-markdownelectrical-calcfloat-stabilityfootnote-attachlead-enrichmentmutation-intentnumber-to-wordspagination-looppatent-strategypod-sufficiencyquote-normalizesentinel-valuessettlement-datetariff-engineertolerance-stackarbitrage-lawyercalendar-convertchunk-boundariescompany-identityconfig-migrationcontract-auditordate-claim-checkdom-recipe-matchjoin-cardinalitylicense-identifylossy-conversionmanuscript-checkmarket-predictorpath-portabilitypermission-deltapre-merge-reviewprecedent-searchreconcile-ledgershelf-life-checkspeech-normalizesyndication-hinttimecode-converturl-canonicalizearchive-preflightbusiness-deadlinecra-exploit-clockcross-field-rulesedit-anchor-checkenum-canonicalizefuture-work-minerplatform-text-fitqualifier-comparerecurrence-expandsite-access-checktime-bucket-checkvault-exit-lawyeracceptance-receiptchargeback-fighterconfirmation-stateconversation-prunedependency-advisorhttp-cache-explainmilestone-verifierreference-verifiertoken-vault-ladderwheel-availabilityassumption-conflictaudit-public-recordcontract-terminatorcredential-coverageduplicate-key-auditjson-patch-conflictlegal-cite-verifierpaperContradictionspronunciation-applyreplication-auditorretry-admissibilitysequence-identifiersmt-contract-proverstate-model-checkertest-exit-interprettoken-due-diligencetoken-trap-detectorunicode-safety-gateworkflow-transitionartifact-invalidatorcalibration-coverageclarification-impactcompressibility-rankconstraint-carryovercrosstalk-deliberatedeadline-feasibilitydev-pipeline-toolkitfarmland-soil-reportforeignResearchScoutidempotency-registryliterary-agent-scoutmanual-applicabilitymedical-bill-auditormetric-comparabilityopen-badges-verifierpatent-design-aroundrequirement-coveragestorage-charge-clocktemporal-constraintstranscript-validatoraccessibility-patcherapproval-invalidationattachment-referencesaudit-prose-forensicscompensation-coveragecompetitor-battlecardcross-reference-checkdockerfile-cache-lintdocument-supersessionevidence-bundle-checkprior-art-invalidatorbooking-change-penaltyfiling-integrity-checkinstruction-data-splitllm-watermark-detectormarkdown-syntax-shapernaive-timestamp-hazardregional-economy-brieftranslation-invariantsai-bom-license-resolverevidence-scope-mismatchidempotency-fingerprintmigration-reversibilityopenapi-breaking-changepermission-intersectionquota-reservation-checkregulatory-change-briefabandoned-compound-minerprice-change-attributiondelegation-contract-checkredirect-credential-checkpacing-intensity-evaluatorproperty-violations-historyinfrastructure-pipeline-brief
com.writerslogic.agents/writerslogic-agents v1.0.0 — 19/100 · Canopii Trust Index