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com.signalaf/contribution-exchange

com.signalaf/contribution-exchange v1.0.0

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 90%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

1 issue capping this score
  • highTool descriptions free of injection markers — 1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)
Reputation6stars1forks2open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Fail
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent. How many servers fail this?

    diagnose-inefficiency — exfiltration directive

    Fix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard27 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    __tests__/analytics/class-ladder.test.mjs:97__tests__/contract/execution-hardening-db.test.mjs:33__tests__/contract/execution-hardening.test.mjs:395__tests__/contract/mock-seed-sync.test.mjs:46

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard22 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    __tests__/contract/execution-hardening.test.mjs:386__tests__/contract/execution-hardening.test.mjs:406__tests__/contract/execution-hardening.test.mjs:411__tests__/contract/execution-hardening.test.mjs:425

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Not checked
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Pass
    IAM / Authentication ScopingOAuth / PRM handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (80)

AmpSNRDevinGooseinputlimitoutputwindowrank_ifsigrankKilo CLILeverageOpenCodeVelocitycodenameplatformCodex CLIQwen CodeGemini CLIYield (Υ)cache_readrank_pasteClaude CodeCopilot CLIMethodologycache_writeHermes Agentbenchmark_meget_operatoroperator_gaprank_windowsself_improveexchange:readfield_anomalyHall of SignalMCP Tool SuiteOMP (Oh My Pi)get_leaderboardsimulate_changeOperator ProfileSigRank SignalAFcompare_to_fielddiagnose_cascadeexchange:attemptexchange:proposeCompare Operatorstarget_percentileCanonical FormulasMetric DefinitionsSigRank MCP Serveroperator_signatureRS05 Class TaxonomySupported Platformsexplain-my-signaturefield-anomaly-reportsuggest_improvementswho_operates_like_meContribution ExchangeLive Field Benchmarksbenchmark-my-operatordiagnose-inefficiencyhow-do-i-reach-top-10AI Operator LeaderboardCascade Analysis ReportPeer and Mentor DiscoveryPremium Operator InsightsDiscover Peers and MentorsField Hub — SigRank ResearchSubmit Token Telemetry SnapshotBenchmark Your AI Coding WorkflowHow to improve your AI coding yieldHow to measure AI coding efficiencyHow to reduce token waste in AI codingHow to benchmark your AI coding workflowHow to compare AI operators with SigRankSigRank SignalAF — AI Operator LeaderboardHow to track your token cascade automaticallyHow to read your token cascade as a diagnosticAI Operator Field Distribution Analysis — SigRankValidate operating ratio selection using cache_write convergence