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dcl-trust-oracle MCP Server Security Report

com.fronesislabs/dcl-trust-oracle

Deterministic AI audit layer for LLM/agent outputs: policy checks, tamper-evident log, x402.

Security Trust Score
Grade D · Weak posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest v2.3.0 Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

This server scored D. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

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1 issue capping this score
  • highTool descriptions free of injection markers — 5 marker(s) across 5 tool(s)
Reputation1stars0forks0open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version v2.3.0

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Fail
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard5 marker(s) across 5 tool(s)

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

    dcl_evaluate_fast — 'ignore previous' overridedcl_evaluate_jailbreak — 'ignore previous' overridedcl_evaluate_secrets — exfiltration directivedcl_evaluate_wallet — exfiltration directive

    Fix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard2 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    telemetry.py:483telemetry.py:511

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No path traversalguardno sinks found

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies1 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
v2.3.0latest41Dscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.

dcl-trust-oracle MCP Server Security — Score 41/100, Grade D · Canopii Trust Index