Is remnant safe to use?

remnant scores 21/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 2 confirmed security failures that cap its score: Tool descriptions free of injection markers and No risky post-publish tool changes (rug-pull). It passes 2 of the 25 controls that apply to it.

What security issues does remnant have?

remnant fails 2 controls: Tool descriptions free of injection markers and No risky post-publish tool changes (rug-pull). Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.

How reliable is the security score for remnant?

We could evaluate 25% of the controls that apply to remnant. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.

Does remnant have any security advisories?

remnant has 6 non-scoring advisories — observations worth a human review that deliberately do not affect the deterministic score, since they can be noisy.

How was remnant scored?

Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

remnant MCP Server Security Report

com.dedale-bi.remnant/remnant

Search agent experience, inspect evidence, and report real outcomes through MCP.

21F

Security Trust Score

Grade F · Serious issues

Tier 2 · Live endpointLow confidence · 25%latest v0.1.0-beta.9.1

Declared MCP capabilities

ResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

2 issues capping this score

highTool descriptions free of injection markers — 1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)
highNo risky post-publish tool changes (rug-pull) — 1 risky tool-definition change(s) in version history (0.1.0-beta.9 → 0.1.0-beta.9.1)

The short answer

Is remnant safe to use?: remnant scores 21/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 2 confirmed security failures that cap its score: Tool descriptions free of injection markers and No risky post-publish tool changes (rug-pull). It passes 2 of the 25 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does remnant have?: remnant fails 2 controls: Tool descriptions free of injection markers and No risky post-publish tool changes (rug-pull). Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for remnant?: We could evaluate 25% of the controls that apply to remnant. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
Does remnant have any security advisories?: remnant has 6 non-scoring advisories — observations worth a human review that deliberately do not affect the deterministic score, since they can be noisy.
How was remnant scored?: Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

Security controlslatest scored version v0.1.0-beta.9.1

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

Fail
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent. How many servers fail this?
try_remnant — exfiltration directive
Fix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.
Fail
Tool Definition Integrityguard1 risky tool-definition change(s) in version history (0.1.0-beta.9 → 0.1.0-beta.9.1)
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns. How many servers fail this?
try_remnant
Fix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.
Pass
User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
Not checked
Strict JSON Schema Enforcementno source files
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Not checked
In-Session Definition Integrityguardno source
Tool and prompt definitions stay fixed during a session — they don't change after a few calls, which is how runtime-gated rug-pulls slip past one-time review.

Application Security Checks

Not checked
No command-injection sinksguardno source
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
Not checked
No dynamic code executionguardno source
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
Not checked
No path traversalguardno source
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
Not checked
No SSRF sinksguardno source
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
Not checked
No unsafe deserializationguardno source
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
Not checked
No committed secretsguardno source
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
Not checked
Credentials sourced from environmentno source files
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
Not checked
Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no source files
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Not checked
Actively maintainedno GitHub repository
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
Not checked
Repository not archivedguardno GitHub repository
Archived repositories will never be patched.
Not checked
Declares a licenseno GitHub repository
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
Not checked
Has a security policyno source files
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Not checked
Signed releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
Not checked
Adoption & popularityno adoption signal
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
N/A
No known-vulnerable dependenciesno dependencies to scan
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
N/A
No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
N/A
Package name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
N/A
Published with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
N/A
Established maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

Warn
IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.
Pass
Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
Not checked
No Token Passthroughguardno source
The client's token is never forwarded to downstream APIs — the server obtains its own, correctly-scoped credential instead.
Not checked
DNS-Rebinding Protectionno source to inspect
HTTP endpoints reject requests carrying an unlisted Origin, so a malicious web page can't drive the server through the user's browser.
Not checked
Execution Sandboxingno source files
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
Not checked
Network Exposureno source files
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
N/A
Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
N/A
Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

AI-flagged — for review

Observations from an AI review of tool descriptions. These are advisory only and do not affect the score — they can be noisy and need human judgement.

info
Tool "search_memories" description changed after publish
Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.
info
Tool "inspect_memory" description changed after publish
Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.
info
Tool "find_agents" description changed after publish
Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

Show 3 more

Embed this score

Add the live badge to your README — it updates automatically on every rescan.

markdown

[![Canopii Trust Score](https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/com.dedale-bi.remnant/remnant)](https://index.canopii.dev/server/com.dedale-bi.remnant/remnant)

html

<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/com.dedale-bi.remnant/remnant"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/com.dedale-bi.remnant/remnant" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>

Versions

Version	Score	Status	Published
v0.1.0-beta.9.1latest	21F	scored	10/4/2026
v0.1.0-beta.9	31F	scored	10/3/2026
v0.1.0-beta.4	26F	scored	9/25/2026
v0.1.0-beta.3	40D	scored	9/23/2026

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.