Is proton-bridge-mcp safe to use?

proton-bridge-mcp scores 80/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 11 of the 20 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.

How reliable is the security score for proton-bridge-mcp?

We could evaluate 73% of the controls that apply to proton-bridge-mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.

How was proton-bridge-mcp scored?

Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

proton-bridge-mcp MCP Server Security Report

com.considus/proton-bridge-mcp

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80B

Security Trust Score

Grade B · Moderate posture

Tier 1 · Public sourceMedium confidence · 73%latest v1.2.0 Repository

Declared MCP capabilities

ToolsResourcesPrompts

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Host com.considus/proton-bridge-mcp in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

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The short answer

Is proton-bridge-mcp safe to use?: proton-bridge-mcp scores 80/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 11 of the 20 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for proton-bridge-mcp?: We could evaluate 73% of the controls that apply to proton-bridge-mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was proton-bridge-mcp scored?: Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

Reputation0stars1forks0open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version v1.2.0

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

Not checked
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno tools extracted
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
Not checked
Strict JSON Schema Enforcementno tool schemas found
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Not checked
User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno tools extracted
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
N/A
Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

Warn
No path traversalguard1 occurrence
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
setup.py:92
Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
Warn
Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).
Warn
Adoption & popularitylimited adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.
Pass
No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
Pass
No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
Pass
No SSRF sinksguardno sinks found
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
Pass
No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
Pass
No committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
Pass
Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
Pass
Actively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
Pass
Repository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
Pass
Declares a licenseApache-2.0
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
Pass
Has a security policySECURITY.md present
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Not checked
No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
Not checked
Signed releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
N/A
No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
N/A
Package name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
N/A
Published with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
N/A
Established maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

Warn
Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.
Pass
Network Exposureno bind-all detected
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
N/A
Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
N/A
IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
N/A
Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
N/A
Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

Version	Score	Status	Published
v1.2.0latest	80B	scored	8/7/2026

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.