api-acre MCP Server Security Report
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This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.
- highTool descriptions free of injection markers — 1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)
The short answer
- Is api-acre safe to use?
- api-acre scores 26/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: Tool descriptions free of injection markers. It passes 2 of the 21 controls that apply to it.
- What security issues does api-acre have?
- api-acre fails 1 control: Tool descriptions free of injection markers. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
- How reliable is the security score for api-acre?
- We could evaluate 24% of the controls that apply to api-acre. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
- How was api-acre scored?
- Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Security controlslatest scored version v0.1.9
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Security controlslatest scored version v0.1.9
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails
- FailIndirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent. How many servers fail this?
developer.secret-scan — exfiltration directiveFix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.
- PassUser-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
- Not checkedStrict JSON Schema Enforcementno source files
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
- N/ATool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
Application Security Checks
- Not checkedNo command-injection sinksguardno source
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
- Not checkedNo dynamic code executionguardno source
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
- Not checkedNo path traversalguardno source
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
- Not checkedNo SSRF sinksguardno source
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
- Not checkedNo unsafe deserializationguardno source
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
- Not checkedNo committed secretsguardno source
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
- Not checkedCredentials sourced from environmentno source files
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
- Not checkedDependencies pinned (lockfile)no source files
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
- Not checkedActively maintainedno GitHub repository
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
- Not checkedRepository not archivedguardno GitHub repository
Archived repositories will never be patched.
- Not checkedDeclares a licenseno GitHub repository
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
- Not checkedHas a security policyno source files
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
- Not checkedSigned releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
- Not checkedAdoption & popularityno adoption signal
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
- N/ANo known-vulnerable dependenciesno dependencies to scan
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
- N/ANo install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
- N/APackage name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
- N/APublished with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
- N/AEstablished maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Transport & Trust Model
- WarnIAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.
- PassTransport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
- Not checkedExecution Sandboxingno source files
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
- Not checkedNetwork Exposureno source files
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
- N/ALive Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
- N/AAuthentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.
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[](https://index.canopii.dev/server/com.apiacre/api-acre)<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/com.apiacre/api-acre"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/com.apiacre/api-acre" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>Versions
| Version | Score | Status | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| v0.1.9latest | 26F | scored | 8/11/2026 |
Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.