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OpenLore MCP Server Security Report

clay-good/OpenLore

Deterministic, local-first memory and guardrails for AI coding agents with no LLM in the hot path.

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest vmain@41faf51 Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

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The short answer

Is OpenLore safe to use?
OpenLore scores 87/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 16 of the 21 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for OpenLore?
We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to OpenLore. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was OpenLore scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation359stars51forks1open issues3d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@41faf51

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No command-injection sinksguard4 occurrences (build/test paths only)

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

    examples/opencode/plugins/openlore-decision-extractor.ts:45examples/opencode/plugins/openlore-decision-extractor.ts:69examples/opencode/plugins/openlore-enforcer.ts:38examples/opencode/plugins/openlore-enforcer.ts:51

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard2 occurrences (build/test paths only)

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    examples/drift-demo/src/auth/auth-middleware.ts:8examples/opencode/plugins/openlore-decision-extractor.ts:217

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard1 occurrence (build/test paths only)

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    examples/opencode/plugins/openlore-decision-extractor.ts:198

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies9 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Canopii Trust Score badge preview
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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@41faf51latest87Bscored
vmain@f66848187Bscored
vmain@591699187Bscored
vmain@3d1f28287Bscored
vmain@f95058a87Bscored
vmain@94969f787Bscored
vmain@f3df01587Bscored
vmain@961584487Bscored
vmain@f33d3b287Bscored
vmain@c931e0f88Bscored
vmain@9ac772088Bscored
vmain@986ef4188Bscored
vmain@f4e631688Bscored
vmain@a58845988Bscored
vmain@9971c6588Bscored
vmain@92cad3288Bscored
vmain@9e6b29788Bscored
vmain@14c5e4488Bscored
vmain@8e6680c88Bscored
vmain@2c30b5888Bscored
vmain@9feaf9088Bscored
vmain@a46412d88Bscored
vmain@2058bc588Bscored
vmain@647675083Bscored
vmain@6f12e9383Bscored
vmain@146af0983Bscored
vmain@6ff46bd83Bscored
vmain@4dbbb8683Bscored
vmain@2eab29b83Bscored
vmain@89edfda83Bscored
vmain@6fbe58d83Bscored
vmain@8bda76a83Bscored
vmain@38eaf7b82Bscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.