chrome-devtools-mcp MCP Server Security Report
Run it securely
Host chromedevtools/chrome-devtools-mcp in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.
Are you the maintainer?
Verify with GitHub to get alerted whenever chromedevtools/chrome-devtools-mcp changes score — and claim the badge for your README.
Claim this serverThe short answer
- Is chrome-devtools-mcp safe to use?
- chrome-devtools-mcp scores 85/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 14 of the 21 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
- How reliable is the security score for chrome-devtools-mcp?
- We could evaluate 90% of the controls that apply to chrome-devtools-mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
- How was chrome-devtools-mcp scored?
- Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Security controlslatest scored version vmain@fadbf41
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Security controlslatest scored version vmain@fadbf41
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails
- WarnStrict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.
- PassIndirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
- PassTool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
- PassUser-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
Application Security Checks
- WarnNo command-injection sinksguard3 occurrences (build/test paths only)
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
scripts/test.js:73scripts/verify-server-json-version.ts:46scripts/verify-server-json-version.ts:53Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.
- WarnNo path traversalguard21 occurrences
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
rollup.config.js:96rollup.config.js:318rollup.config.js:325scripts/eslint_rules/check-license-rule.js:45Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
- WarnNo SSRF sinksguard4 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
src/McpContext.ts:881src/bin/check-latest-version.ts:41src/index.ts:85src/telemetry/watchdog/ClearcutSender.ts:203Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
- PassNo dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
- PassNo unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
- PassNo committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
- PassCredentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
- PassDependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
- PassActively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
- PassRepository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
- PassDeclares a licenseApache-2.0
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
- PassHas a security policySECURITY.md present
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
- PassAdoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
- Not checkedNo known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
- Not checkedSigned releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
- N/ANo install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
- N/APackage name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
- N/APublished with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
- N/AEstablished maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Transport & Trust Model
- WarnExecution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.
- PassNetwork Exposureno bind-all detected
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
- N/ATransport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
- N/AIAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
- N/ALive Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
- N/AAuthentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.
Embed this score
Add the live badge to your README — it updates automatically on every rescan.
[](https://index.canopii.dev/server/chromedevtools/chrome-devtools-mcp)<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/chromedevtools/chrome-devtools-mcp"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/chromedevtools/chrome-devtools-mcp" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>Versions
| Version | Score | Status | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| vlatest | 84B | scored | — |
| vmain@d1baa90 | 85B | scored | 8/27/2026 |
| vmain@2dc104c | 85B | scored | 8/26/2026 |
| vmain@45f187b | 85B | scored | 8/25/2026 |
| vmain@50a16fa | 81B | scored | 8/24/2026 |
| vmain@ebf58f2 | 85B | scored | 8/23/2026 |
| vmain@2ce42f8 | 85B | scored | 8/21/2026 |
| vmain@8f25f69 | 85B | scored | 8/20/2026 |
| vmain@61e312f | 85B | scored | 8/19/2026 |
| vmain@fadbf41latest | 85B | scored | 8/18/2026 |
| vmain@1c92ba0 | 15F | scored | 8/17/2026 |
| vmain@fce756a | 16F | scored | 8/16/2026 |
| vmain@5d02839 | 16F | scored | 8/14/2026 |
| vmain@c0a7417 | 16F | scored | 8/13/2026 |
| vmain@b58c613 | 16F | scored | 8/12/2026 |
| vmain@9ab13a1 | 15F | scored | 8/11/2026 |
| vmain@8028bfe | 84B | scored | 8/7/2026 |
Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.