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stata-code MCP Server Security Report

brycewang-stanford/stata-code

Agent-native Stata bridge for empirical research — run DiD/IV/RDD and publication-ready tables from Claude Code, Jupyter, or VS Code on one token-economy result schema, with StatsPAI cross-validation. | 面向实证研究的智能体 Stata 桥接器——在 Claude Code、Jupyter、VS Code 中用一套省 token 的结果格式跑 DiD/IV/RDD 与出版级表格，并支持 StatsPAI 跨栈交叉验证。

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 76%latest vmain@9c0b13c Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ToolsResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

Host brycewang-stanford/stata-code in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

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The short answer

Is stata-code safe to use?
stata-code scores 80/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 14 of the 20 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for stata-code?
We could evaluate 76% of the controls that apply to stata-code. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was stata-code scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation52stars6forks0open issues15d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@9c0b13c

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Not checked
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno tools extracted

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Not checked
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno tools extracted

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard9 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    vscode/src/dataBrowser.ts:24vscode/src/dtaFilter.ts:764vscode/src/renameMask.ts:17vscode/src/renameMask.ts:17

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No SSRF sinksguardno sinks found

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@9c0b13clatest80Bscored
vmain@f89245680Bscored
vmain@f75aa7c80Bscored
vmain@a95574880Bscored
vmain@0979e0780Bscored
vmain@bbca9fb80Bscored
vmain@0ea891780Bscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.