CanopiiCanopiiAll serversEnterprise →

homelab-mcp MCP Server Security Report

bjeans/homelab-mcp

Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers for managing homelab infrastructure through Claude Desktop. Monitor Docker/Podman containers, Ollama AI models, Pi-hole DNS, Unifi networks, and Ansible inventory. Includes security checks, templates, and automated pre-push validation. Production-ready for homelabs.

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceMedium confidence · 73%latest vmain@ad9eddb Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ToolsResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

Are you the maintainer?

Verify with GitHub to get alerted whenever bjeans/homelab-mcp changes score — and claim the badge for your README.

Claim this server
1 issue capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks1 occurrence

The short answer

Is homelab-mcp safe to use?
homelab-mcp scores 17/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No command-injection sinks. It passes 13 of the 20 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does homelab-mcp have?
homelab-mcp fails 1 control: No command-injection sinks. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for homelab-mcp?
We could evaluate 73% of the controls that apply to homelab-mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was homelab-mcp scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation39stars8forks19open issues49d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@ad9eddb

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Not checked
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno tools extracted

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Not checked
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementno tool schemas found

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Not checked
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno tools extracted

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard1 occurrence

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    helpers/run_checks.py:34

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No path traversalguardno sinks found

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Pass
    No SSRF sinksguardno sinks found

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Embed this score

Add the live badge to your README — it updates automatically on every rescan.

Canopii Trust Score badge preview
markdown[![Canopii Trust Score](https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/bjeans/homelab-mcp)](https://index.canopii.dev/server/bjeans/homelab-mcp)
html<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/bjeans/homelab-mcp"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/bjeans/homelab-mcp" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>

Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@ad9eddblatest17Fscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.