CanopiiCanopiiAll serversEnterprise →

mcp MCP Server Security Report

awslabs/mcp

Amazon Web Services: AWS service monorepo; multiple servers by subfolder.

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest vmain@6f45312 Repository Vendor-published
Declared MCP capabilities
Prompts

Run it securely

Host awslabs/mcp in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

Are you the maintainer?

Verify with GitHub to get alerted whenever awslabs/mcp changes score — and claim the badge for your README.

Claim this server

The short answer

Is mcp safe to use?
mcp scores 87/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 16 of the 22 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for mcp?
We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was mcp scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation9.9kstars1.9kforks258open issuestodaylast commit2yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@6f45312

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    In-Session Definition Integrityguardno call-gated or call-time tool definition changes

    Tool and prompt definitions stay fixed during a session — they don't change after a few calls, which is how runtime-gated rug-pulls slip past one-time review.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard1 occurrence

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    docusaurus/src/components/ServerCards/index.tsx:58

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard2 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    src/amazon-bedrock-agentcore-mcp-server/awslabs/amazon_bedrock_agentcore_mcp_server/utils/doc_fetcher.py:60src/amazon-mq-mcp-server/awslabs/amazon_mq_mcp_server/rabbitmq/admin.py:41

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies72 of 1448 runtime deps vulnerable; worst critical

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    [email protected] — GHSA-rj75-hqrm-r3gf[email protected] — GHSA-2g4f-4pwh-qvx6[email protected] — GHSA-27r3-jxmh-p828[email protected] — GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseApache-2.0

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    No Token Passthroughguardno HTTP transport

    The client's token is never forwarded to downstream APIs — the server obtains its own, correctly-scoped credential instead.

  • N/A
    DNS-Rebinding Protectionno HTTP transport

    HTTP endpoints reject requests carrying an unlisted Origin, so a malicious web page can't drive the server through the user's browser.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Embed this score

Add the live badge to your README — it updates automatically on every rescan.

Canopii Trust Score badge preview
markdown[![Canopii Trust Score](https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/awslabs/mcp)](https://index.canopii.dev/server/awslabs/mcp)
html<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/awslabs/mcp"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/awslabs/mcp" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>

Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@6f45312latest87Bscored
vmain@e892a8c86Bscored
vmain@919c48c86Bscored
vmain@5fa8de786Bscored
vmain@69e266686Bscored
vmain@c6951b986Bscored
vmain@1a2c53886Bscored
vmain@e36627a86Bscored
vmain@8bbd85786Bscored
vmain@24c397086Bscored
vmain@b054d1986Bscored
vmain@6e93da886Bscored
vmain@d3969ea86Bscored
vmain@d534d0f86Bscored
vmain@36d8d3a86Bscored
vmain@8e802d686Bscored
vmain@e1abc4b86Bscored
vmain@c19578d87Bscored
vmain@0ad292187Bscored
vmain@8055d6887Bscored
vmain@5abe7e887Bscored
vmain@b7d641a87Bscored
vmain@6864d7b87Bscored
vmain@47e6ece87Bscored
vmain@d80b52d87Bscored
vmain@69a3cb087Bscored
vmain@1941e3787Bscored
vmain@3e0418f87Bscored
vmain@2fec29087Bscored
vmain@920679987Bscored
vmain@61d8b4587Bscored
vmain@74e91e087Bscored
vmain@328d79787Bscored
vmain@8d5048987Bscored
vmain@b214d2487Bscored
vmain@a05c9bf87Bscored
vmain@2b3e77a87Bscored
vmain@83ac91386Bscored
vmain@27e3e6087Bscored
vmain@c9102a987Bscored
vmain@6d6067c86Bscored
vmain@e9f243986Bscored
vmain@074faec87Bscored
vmain@5609db987Bscored
vmain@302788b86Bscored
vmain@025383887Bscored
vmain@2a07bb887Bscored
vmain@e74a3dd87Bscored
vmain@100b55b86Bscored
vmain@9f4aff787Bscored
vmain@0e7ae4887Bscored
vmain@31bd64387Bscored
vmain@6d289e187Bscored
vmain@eff6cce87Bscored
vmain@cdd87a887Bscored
vmain@ebcafae87Bscored
vmain@7ad53dc86Bscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.