tree-sitter-analyzer MCP Server Security Report
Cross-language-safe code-intelligence MCP for AI agents -- 13 languages, family-gated call graph (CodeGraph 745 vs TSA 6 cross-language mis-wires, v1.21.0 same-session -- ~124x by count, ~390x by rate; re-verifying vs current develop). Run miswire-audit on your repo. 8 facade tools, TOON output, 100% local. Python.
Run it securely
Host aimasteracc/tree-sitter-analyzer in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.
Are you the maintainer?
Verify with GitHub to get alerted whenever aimasteracc/tree-sitter-analyzer changes score — and claim the badge for your README.
Claim this serverThe short answer
- Is tree-sitter-analyzer safe to use?
- tree-sitter-analyzer scores 80/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 12 of the 20 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
- How reliable is the security score for tree-sitter-analyzer?
- We could evaluate 73% of the controls that apply to tree-sitter-analyzer. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
- How was tree-sitter-analyzer scored?
- Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Security controlslatest scored version vmain@335e78b
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Security controlslatest scored version vmain@335e78b
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails
- Not checkedIndirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno tools extracted
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
- Not checkedStrict JSON Schema Enforcementno tool schemas found
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
- Not checkedUser-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno tools extracted
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
- N/ATool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
Application Security Checks
- WarnNo SSRF sinksguard6 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
examples/ModernJavaScript.js:78examples/ModernJavaScript.js:209examples/ModernJavaScript.js:238examples/ModernJavaScript.js:318Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
- WarnDependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).
- PassRepository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
- PassDeclares a licenseMIT
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
- PassHas a security policySECURITY.md present
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
- PassNo command-injection sinksguardno sinks found
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
- PassNo dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
- PassNo path traversalguardno sinks found
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
- PassNo unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
- PassNo committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
- PassCredentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
- PassActively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
- PassAdoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
- Not checkedSigned releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
- Not checkedNo known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
- N/ANo install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
- N/APackage name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
- N/APublished with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
- N/AEstablished maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Transport & Trust Model
- WarnNetwork Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.
- PassExecution Sandboxingcontainerized
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
- N/ATransport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
- N/AIAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
- N/ALive Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
- N/AAuthentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.
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[](https://index.canopii.dev/server/aimasteracc/tree-sitter-analyzer)<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/aimasteracc/tree-sitter-analyzer"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/aimasteracc/tree-sitter-analyzer" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>Versions
| Version | Score | Status | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| vmain@335e78blatest | 80B | scored | 8/9/2026 |
Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.