CanopiiCanopiiAll serversEnterprise →
ai.marketcode/marketcode

ai.marketcode/marketcode v1.0.0

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 2 · Live endpointLow confidence · 24%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

1 issue capping this score
  • highTool descriptions free of injection markers — 1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Fail
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent. How many servers fail this?

    site_appraisal — conceal-from-user directive

    Fix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • Not checked
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementno source files

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Not checked
    No command-injection sinksguardno source

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Not checked
    No dynamic code executionguardno source

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Not checked
    No path traversalguardno source

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Not checked
    No SSRF sinksguardno source

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Not checked
    No unsafe deserializationguardno source

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Not checked
    No committed secretsguardno source

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Not checked
    Credentials sourced from environmentno source files

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Not checked
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no source files

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Not checked
    Actively maintainedno GitHub repository

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Not checked
    Repository not archivedguardno GitHub repository

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Not checked
    Declares a licenseno GitHub repository

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Not checked
    Has a security policyno source files

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • Not checked
    Adoption & popularityno adoption signal

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • N/A
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno dependencies to scan

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Not checked
    Execution Sandboxingno source files

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Not checked
    Network Exposureno source files

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (99)

lha_rateactor_pathbuild_costcost_indexh3_densityarea_reportarea_resolveask_questionauction_lotsmarket_factsactor_networkauction_compsauction_statschanges_sincedata_coverageland_assemblymarket_yieldsowner_profileparcel_lookupsupply_demandagent_activityenergy_profilemarket_profilemarket_rankingmortgage_ratesplanning_checkproperty_compsproperty_leaseproperty_mediaquery_semanticsearch_summarysite_appraisalvaluation_fulladdress_by_uprnaddress_resolveequity_estimatelisting_historylookup_entitiesmarket_forecastproperty_lookupproperty_reportsearch_entitiessolar_potentialsourcing_ownerssourcing_searchtime_adjustmentauction_discountcouncil_tax_bandepc_certificatesplot_utilisationproperty_historyproperty_summarybuilding_physicalcommercial_marketcomps_adjustmentsdistressed_assetsarea_stock_profileownership_by_titleproperty_reconcilevaluation_accuracyvaluation_estimateaddress_by_postcodecommercial_propertymarket_index_seriesmixed_use_buildingsplanning_precedentsproperty_flood_riskretrofit_candidatessourcing_commercialsourcing_strategiesaddress_autocompletearea_reverse_geocodeentity_relationshipslisting_stock_seriesmarket_volume_seriesownership_by_companyproperty_lease_batchproperty_risk_reporttransactions_by_uprnlisting_market_serieslong_held_high_equitymarket_volume_rankingplanning_applicationsplanning_designationsvaluation_comparablessourcing_live_listingscommercial_index_seriesasking_rent_index_seriesproperty_energy_retrofitproperty_rental_estimateasking_price_index_seriesproperty_planning_historysourcing_offmarket_ownersentity_search_capabilitiesproperty_risk_report_batchsubject_transaction_anchorvaluation_rent_comparablescommercial_rent_index_seriesproperty_planning_history_batch