CanopiiCanopiiAll serversEnterprise →

mnemiq MCP Server Security Report

agenticfabriq/mnemiq

Open-source text-to-SQL engine you tune and measure on your own database

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 90%latest vmain@86b2bcf Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

Host agenticfabriq/mnemiq in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

Are you the maintainer?

Verify with GitHub to get alerted whenever agenticfabriq/mnemiq changes score — and claim the badge for your README.

Claim this server

The short answer

Is mnemiq safe to use?
mnemiq scores 89/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 15 of the 21 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for mnemiq?
We could evaluate 90% of the controls that apply to mnemiq. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was mnemiq scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation112stars29forks1open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@86b2bcf

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard7 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    scripts/run_native_slm.py:218scripts/seed_demo.py:116scripts/seed_demo.py:119src/mnemiq/eval/bird.py:37

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard1 occurrence (build/test paths only)

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    scripts/run_native_slm.py:360

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseApache-2.0

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Embed this score

Add the live badge to your README — it updates automatically on every rescan.

Canopii Trust Score badge preview
markdown[![Canopii Trust Score](https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/agenticfabriq/mnemiq)](https://index.canopii.dev/server/agenticfabriq/mnemiq)
html<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/agenticfabriq/mnemiq"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/agenticfabriq/mnemiq" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>

Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@86b2bcflatest89Bscored
vmain@e7272b689Bscored
vmain@82e431089Bscored
vmain@bb116da89Bscored
vmain@04e2b1389Bscored
vmain@095f12989Bscored
vmain@4f4f4e889Bscored
vmain@195bca989Bscored
vmain@d1e7fcc89Bscored
vmain@d35742a89Bscored
vmain@dd781f389Bscored
vmain@3bc54ff89Bscored
vmain@70188c489Bscored
vmain@a9a31de89Bscored
vmain@ecdd22e89Bscored
vmain@bee6cd289Bscored
vmain@9d181ae90Ascored
vmain@466bc1390Ascored
vmain@14ab49c90Ascored
vmain@409de9b90Ascored
vmain@2baa33190Ascored
vmain@de9007289Bscored
vmain@8d1535288Bscored
vmain@1a1c9f189Bscored
vmain@32211e189Bscored
vmain@2f7ad3189Bscored
vmain@447afab89Bscored
vmain@0f2cfbc89Bscored
vmain@dc6cb1d89Bscored
vmain@ecf32ce88Bscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.