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ageborn-dev/architect-mcp-server

ageborn-dev/architect-mcp-server vmain@1d7cb70

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

2 issues capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks — 1 occurrence
  • criticalNo dynamic code execution — 1 occurrence
Reputation25stars4forks0open issues57d agolast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard1 occurrence

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    src/core/sandbox.ts:490

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Fail
    No dynamic code executionguard1 occurrence

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution. How many servers fail this?

    src/execution/pipelines.ts:129

    Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard6 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    src/core/capabilities.ts:176src/core/sandbox-process.ts:112src/core/sandbox.ts:144src/dashboard/dashboard.ts:492

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard7 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    dashboard/app.js:58dashboard/app.js:348dashboard/app.js:387dashboard/app.js:442

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies7 of 128 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    @hono/[email protected] — GHSA-92pp-h63x-v22m@hono/[email protected] — GHSA-frvp-7c67-39w9[email protected] — GHSA-v422-hmwv-36x6[email protected] — GHSA-4c8g-83qw-93j6

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (80)

browser_pdfbrowser_backbrowser_dragbrowser_evalbrowser_fillbrowser_findbrowser_openbrowser_typebrowser_waitbrowser_checkbrowser_clickbrowser_focusbrowser_framebrowser_hoverbrowser_keyupbrowser_pressbrowser_reloadbrowser_scrollbrowser_selectbrowser_uploadbrowser_consolebrowser_forwardbrowser_get_boxbrowser_get_urlbrowser_keydownbrowser_set_geobrowser_tab_newbrowser_uncheckbrowser_dblclickbrowser_diff_urlbrowser_get_attrbrowser_get_htmlbrowser_get_textbrowser_mouse_upbrowser_snapshotbrowser_tab_listbrowser_get_countbrowser_get_titlebrowser_get_valuebrowser_highlightbrowser_set_mediabrowser_tab_closebrowser_get_stylesbrowser_is_checkedbrowser_is_enabledbrowser_is_visiblebrowser_mouse_downbrowser_mouse_movebrowser_screenshotbrowser_set_devicebrowser_state_listbrowser_state_loadbrowser_state_savebrowser_tab_switchbrowser_trace_stopbrowser_window_newbrowser_cookies_getbrowser_cookies_setbrowser_mouse_wheelbrowser_page_errorsbrowser_set_headersbrowser_set_offlinebrowser_state_clearbrowser_storage_getbrowser_storage_setbrowser_trace_startbrowser_set_viewportbrowser_cookies_clearbrowser_dialog_acceptbrowser_diff_snapshotbrowser_keyboard_typebrowser_network_routebrowser_storage_clearbrowser_dialog_dismissbrowser_diff_screenshotbrowser_network_unroutebrowser_set_credentialsbrowser_network_requestsbrowser_scroll_into_viewbrowser_keyboard_insert_text