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Zen4-bit/Proxima

Zen4-bit/Proxima vmain@0e92241

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
Prompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

2 issues capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks — 8 occurrences
  • criticalNo dynamic code execution — 1 occurrence
Reputation1.2kstars163forks28open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    In-Session Definition Integrityguardno call-gated or call-time tool definition changes

    Tool and prompt definitions stay fixed during a session — they don't change after a few calls, which is how runtime-gated rug-pulls slip past one-time review.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard8 occurrences

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    proxima-agent/proxima_agent/cli.py:14proxima-agent/proxima_agent/tools/coding/repo_intel.py:1853proxima-agent/proxima_agent/tools/coding/repo_intel.py:1938proxima-agent/proxima_agent/tools/computer/core.py:270

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Fail
    No dynamic code executionguard1 occurrence

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution. How many servers fail this?

    proxima-agent/proxima_agent/tools/_exec_worker.py:121

    Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard85 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    cli/proxima-cli.cjs:471cli/proxima-cli.cjs:697cli/proxima-cli.cjs:699cli/proxima-cli.cjs:701

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard51 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    cli/proxima-cli.cjs:104cli/proxima-cli.cjs:170electron/api/byok/providers/_http.cjs:38electron/providers/engines/chatgpt-engine.js:1147

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies15 of 206 runtime deps vulnerable; worst critical

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    @hono/[email protected] — GHSA-92pp-h63x-v22m@hono/[email protected] — GHSA-frvp-7c67-39w9@hono/[email protected] — GHSA-wc8c-qw6v-h7f6@modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] — GHSA-345p-7cg4-v4c7

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Warn
    Declares a licenseno recognized license

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

    Fix: Add a recognized SPDX license (MIT, Apache-2.0, …).

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    No Token Passthroughguardno HTTP transport

    The client's token is never forwarded to downstream APIs — the server obtains its own, correctly-scoped credential instead.

  • N/A
    DNS-Rebinding Protectionno HTTP transport

    HTTP endpoints reject requests carrying an unlisted Origin, so a malicious web page can't drive the server through the user's browser.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (62)

chatcrewsolvedebateverifyAnalyzecomparecontentexecuterun_loopTranslateagent-hubask_modelfix_errorBrainstormGemini ProScrape URLWeb searchask_claudeask_geminiddg_searchweb_scrapeGemini Autoask_all_aisask_chatgptclear_cachedeep_searchhide_windowreview_codeshow_windowsmart_queryverify_codewrite_testsGemini ArgonGemini Flashanalyze_fileconvert_codeexplain_coderun_workflowGemini Latestexplain_errorgenerate_codeoptimize_codetoggle_windowCode assistantSecurity auditask_perplexitysecurity_auditMulti-AI debateMulti-agent crewget_ui_referencenew_conversationreview_code_fileChrome PDF PluginDuckDuckGo searchset_headless_modebuild_architectureproxima_cost_reportClaude Session Modellist_available_modelsPerplexity Live Searchproxima_agentic_status