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CloudBase-AI-Toolkit MCP Server Security Report

TencentCloudBase/CloudBase-AI-Toolkit

Backend for AI coding agents on CloudBase — database, auth, functions via Plugin, Skills & MCP.

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest vmain@6bcc3dc Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

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The short answer

Is CloudBase-AI-Toolkit safe to use?
CloudBase-AI-Toolkit scores 83/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 13 of the 21 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for CloudBase-AI-Toolkit?
We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to CloudBase-AI-Toolkit. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
Does CloudBase-AI-Toolkit have any security advisories?
CloudBase-AI-Toolkit has 1 non-scoring advisory — observations worth a human review that deliberately do not affect the deterministic score, since they can be noisy.
How was CloudBase-AI-Toolkit scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation1.1kstars133forks1open issues20d agolast commit1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@6bcc3dc

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Warn
    Tool Definition Integrityguard1 tool description(s) drifted after publish (no risk signals in diff)

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

    projection

    Fix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard5 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    doc/components/ErrorCodeIDEButton.tsx:57doc/components/ErrorCodeIDEButton.tsx:118doc/components/IDESelector.tsx:857mcp/scripts/test-with-ticket.cjs:42

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard4 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    examples/cloudbase-auth-endpoint-with-feishu/src/utils/auth.ts:34mcp/scripts/test-with-ticket.cjs:109mcp/scripts/verify-npm-tarball-smoke.mjs:91mcp/scripts/verify-npm-tarball-smoke.mjs:129

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies14 of 627 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    [email protected] — GHSA-p6mc-m468-83gw[email protected] — GHSA-2g4f-4pwh-qvx6[email protected] — GHSA-w5hq-g745-h8pq[email protected] — GHSA-w5hq-g745-h8pq

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

AI-flagged — for review

Observations from an AI review of tool descriptions. These are advisory only and do not affect the score — they can be noisy and need human judgement.

  • info
    Tool "projection" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@476fa6987Bscored
vmain@02a4d8790Ascored
vmain@3ce25cd87Bscored
vmain@adf5fbe90Ascored
vmain@1938cad90Ascored
vmain@8600cb390Ascored
vmain@16cce4b90Ascored
vmain@43b60e590Ascored
vmain@d6cefd590Ascored
vmain@f07c33c87Bscored
vmain@f0170d985Bscored
vmain@fb35f3585Bscored
vmain@cc44e0985Bscored
vmain@615abd985Bscored
vmain@6bcc3dclatest83Bscored
vmain@1a3fe2f83Bscored
vmain@45035fc85Bscored
vmain@c1a84a715Fscored
vmain@91b042a15Fscored
vmain@442bc8c85Bscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.