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TacosyHorchata/Pilot

TacosyHorchata/Pilot vmain@5ed6794

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

2 issues capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks — 4 occurrences
  • criticalNo dynamic code execution — 1 occurrence
Reputation32stars4forks2open issues42d agolast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard4 occurrences

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    scripts/pilot-codex-exec-stress.js:257src/extension-server.ts:691src/extension-server.ts:702src/extension-server.ts:737

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Fail
    No dynamic code executionguard1 occurrence

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution. How many servers fail this?

    extension/content.js:334

    Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard24 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    extension/content.js:487scripts/pilot-codex-exec-stress.js:186scripts/pilot-codex-exec-stress.js:189scripts/pilot-codex-exec-stress.js:259

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies9 of 135 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    @hono/[email protected] — GHSA-92pp-h63x-v22m@hono/[email protected] — GHSA-frvp-7c67-39w9[email protected] — GHSA-v422-hmwv-36x6[email protected] — GHSA-73rr-hh4g-fpgx

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No SSRF sinksguardno sinks found

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (69)

pilot_actpilot_cdppilot_getpilot_pdfpilot_authpilot_backpilot_dragpilot_fillpilot_findpilot_perfpilot_tabspilot_typepilot_waitpilot_blockpilot_clickpilot_closepilot_guidepilot_hoverpilot_resetpilot_assertpilot_dialogpilot_doctorpilot_framespilot_reloadpilot_resizepilot_resumepilot_scrollpilot_statuspilot_consolepilot_cookiespilot_forwardpilot_handoffpilot_networkpilot_storagepilot_tab_newpilot_evaluatepilot_navigatepilot_page_csspilot_snapshotpilot_clipboardpilot_interceptpilot_page_diffpilot_page_htmlpilot_page_textpilot_press_keypilot_tab_closepilot_page_attrspilot_page_formspilot_page_linkspilot_responsivepilot_screenshotpilot_set_cookiepilot_set_headerpilot_tab_selectpilot_file_uploadpilot_frame_resetpilot_geolocationpilot_frame_selectpilot_element_statepilot_evidence_steppilot_handle_dialogpilot_select_optionpilot_set_useragentpilot_snapshot_diffpilot_evidence_startpilot_import_cookiespilot_evidence_exportpilot_extension_statuspilot_annotated_screenshot