mcp-server-db2i MCP Server Security Report
Read-only MCP server that lets Claude, Cursor and other AI assistants query IBM Db2 for i (IBM i, AS/400). People sign in with their own IBM i user; library allowlist, column masking and audit log. Self-hosted, over ODBC, JDBC or Mapepire (SSH).
Run it securely
Host Strom-Capital/mcp-server-db2i in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.
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Claim this serverThe short answer
- Is mcp-server-db2i safe to use?
- mcp-server-db2i scores 86/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 15 of the 21 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
- How reliable is the security score for mcp-server-db2i?
- We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to mcp-server-db2i. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
- How was mcp-server-db2i scored?
- Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Security controlslatest scored version vmain@4e1a16d
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Security controlslatest scored version vmain@4e1a16d
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails
- WarnStrict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.
- PassIndirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
- PassIn-Session Definition Integrityguardno call-gated or call-time tool definition changes
Tool and prompt definitions stay fixed during a session — they don't change after a few calls, which is how runtime-gated rug-pulls slip past one-time review.
- PassUser-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
- N/ATool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
Application Security Checks
- WarnNo path traversalguard24 occurrences
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
docs/md-links.js:8examples/web-app/app/api/mcp-app/resource/route.ts:12examples/web-app/components/ai-elements/prompt-input.tsx:570examples/web-app/components/ai-elements/prompt-input.tsx:866Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
- WarnNo SSRF sinksguard3 occurrences (build/test paths only)
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
examples/web-app/components/ai-elements/prompt-input.tsx:83examples/web-app/lib/server/models.ts:133examples/web-app/lib/server/oauth.ts:259Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
- WarnNo known-vulnerable dependencies2 of 933 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
[email protected] — GHSA-vfj7-8cjw-p6xm[email protected] — GHSA-238p-pmpm-9mq7Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.
- PassNo command-injection sinksguardno sinks found
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
- PassNo dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
- PassNo unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
- PassNo committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
- PassCredentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
- PassDependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
- PassActively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
- PassRepository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
- PassDeclares a licenseMIT
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
- PassHas a security policySECURITY.md present
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
- PassAdoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
- Not checkedSigned releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
- N/ANo install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
- N/APackage name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
- N/APublished with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
- N/AEstablished maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Transport & Trust Model
- WarnNetwork Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.
- PassExecution Sandboxingcontainerized
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
- N/ATransport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
- N/AIAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
- N/ANo Token Passthroughguardno HTTP transport
The client's token is never forwarded to downstream APIs — the server obtains its own, correctly-scoped credential instead.
- N/ADNS-Rebinding Protectionno HTTP transport
HTTP endpoints reject requests carrying an unlisted Origin, so a malicious web page can't drive the server through the user's browser.
- N/ALive Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
- N/AAuthentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.
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[](https://index.canopii.dev/server/Strom-Capital/mcp-server-db2i)<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/Strom-Capital/mcp-server-db2i"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/Strom-Capital/mcp-server-db2i" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>Versions
| Version | Score | Status | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| vmain@4e1a16dlatest | 86B | scored | 10/15/2026 |
Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.