Storybloq/storybloq vmain@a948e06

59D

Security Trust Score

Grade D · Weak posture

Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%rubric 2.9.0

Declared MCP capabilities

ResourcesPrompts

This server scored D. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

1 issue capping this score

mediumNo over-broad / destructive tools — 1 over-broad tool(s)

Reputation755stars39forks6open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

Fail
User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguard1 over-broad tool(s)
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval. How many servers fail this?
duet spawn
Fix: Scope tools narrowly; avoid arbitrary command execution and destructive defaults.
Warn
Tool Definition Integrityguard4 tool description(s) drifted after publish (no risk signals in diff)
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
ruling listruling getruling createruling supersede
Fix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.
Pass
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
Pass
Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

Application Security Checks

Warn
No path traversalguard137 occurrences
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
bench/terminal-bench/agents/telemetry-copier.cjs:92plugins/storybloq/hooks/ledger-write-detection.ts:143plugins/storybloq/hooks/ledger-write-detection.ts:250plugins/storybloq/hooks/ledger-write-detection.ts:263
Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
Warn
No SSRF sinksguard2 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
bench/terminal-bench/manifest/prepare.py:95src/bus/codex-app-server.ts:636
Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
Warn
No known-vulnerable dependencies2 of 160 runtime deps vulnerable; worst medium
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
[email protected] — GHSA-crvj-82cr-hjcx[email protected] — GHSA-g6gw-c38x-mqfc[email protected] — GHSA-gqvv-2mrq-wpjv[email protected] — GHSA-4mjr-xmp4-gh2g
Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.
Warn
Declares a licenseno recognized license
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
Fix: Add a recognized SPDX license (MIT, Apache-2.0, …).
Pass
No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
Pass
No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
Pass
No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
Pass
No committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
Pass
Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
Pass
Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Pass
Actively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
Pass
Repository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
Pass
Has a security policySECURITY.md present
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Pass
Adoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
Not checked
Signed releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
N/A
No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
N/A
Package name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
N/A
Published with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
N/A
Established maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

Warn
Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.
Pass
Network Exposureno bind-all detected
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
N/A
Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
N/A
IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
N/A
Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
N/A
Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (80)

initbriefrecapexporthealthstatusPhase 1note getselftestsnapshotterm addterm getvalidateissue getnote listrecommendreferenceterm listduet spawnissue listissue metalesson getphase listphase moveruling getterm checkterm deferterm matchticket getblocker addlesson listnote createnote deletenote updateruling listterm removeterm updateticket listticket metaticket nextblocker listcodex-reviewhandover getissue createissue deleteissue updatelimit-statusphase createphase deletephase renameblocker clearhandover listlesson createlesson deletelesson digestlesson updatephase currentphase ticketsruling acceptruling createticket createticket deleteticket updatecapability addcapability getruling proposeticket blockedcapability listhandover createhandover latestruling withdrawcapability checkcapability defercapability matchlesson reinforceruling supersedecapability updatehandover templatearrangement rotatearrangement compact

AI-flagged — for review

Observations from an AI review of tool descriptions. These are advisory only and do not affect the score — they can be noisy and need human judgement.

info
Tool "ruling list" description changed after publish
Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.
info
Tool "ruling get" description changed after publish
Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.
info
Tool "ruling create" description changed after publish
Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

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