Is codebase-context safe to use?

codebase-context scores 15/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No command-injection sinks. It passes 11 of the 20 controls that apply to it.

What security issues does codebase-context have?

codebase-context fails 1 control: No command-injection sinks. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.

How reliable is the security score for codebase-context?

We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to codebase-context. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.

How was codebase-context scored?

Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

codebase-context MCP Server Security Report

PatrickSys/codebase-context

Codebase Context gives AI agents understanding of your codebase through semantic code search, team conventions, patterns, and memory, so they use fewer tokens, spend less time, and produce better, more familiar output.

15F

Security Trust Score

Grade F · Serious issues

Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest vmaster@a8e354e Repository

Declared MCP capabilities

ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

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1 issue capping this score

criticalNo command-injection sinks — 16 occurrences

The short answer

Is codebase-context safe to use?: codebase-context scores 15/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No command-injection sinks. It passes 11 of the 20 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does codebase-context have?: codebase-context fails 1 control: No command-injection sinks. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for codebase-context?: We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to codebase-context. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was codebase-context scored?: Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

Reputation58stars13forks5open issues13d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmaster@a8e354e

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

Pass
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
Pass
Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Pass
User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
N/A
Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

Fail
No command-injection sinksguard16 occurrences
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?
scripts/contextbench-cgc-relevant-candidate-pack.mjs:110scripts/contextbench-codegraphcontext-content-pack.mjs:83scripts/contextbench-codegraphcontext-content-pack.mjs:85scripts/contextbench-codegraphcontext-ready-pack.mjs:86
Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.
Warn
No path traversalguard117 occurrences
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
scripts/contextbench-cbm-candidate-pack.mjs:70scripts/contextbench-cbm-candidate-pack.mjs:76scripts/contextbench-cgc-relevant-candidate-pack.mjs:65scripts/contextbench-codegraphcontext-content-pack.mjs:62
Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
Warn
No SSRF sinksguard2 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
scripts/contextbench-select-slice.mjs:145src/embeddings/openai.ts:45
Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
Warn
No known-vulnerable dependencies16 of 554 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
[email protected] — GHSA-2gcr-mfcq-wcc3[email protected] — GHSA-3hrh-pfw6-9m5x[email protected] — GHSA-54fx-42gc-7vw4[email protected] — GHSA-69xw-7hcm-h432
Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.
Warn
Declares a licenseno recognized license
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
Fix: Add a recognized SPDX license (MIT, Apache-2.0, …).
Warn
Has a security policyno security policy
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.
Pass
No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
Pass
No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
Pass
No committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
Pass
Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
Pass
Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Pass
Actively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
Pass
Repository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
Pass
Adoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
Not checked
Signed releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
N/A
No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
N/A
Package name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
N/A
Published with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
N/A
Established maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

Warn
Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.
Warn
Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.
N/A
Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
N/A
IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
N/A
Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
N/A
Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

Version	Score	Status	Published
vmaster@a8e354elatest	15F	scored	7/26/2026

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.