LogLead MCP Server Security Report
LogLead performs log loading, log enhancement, log feature engineering, log analysis, log anomaly detection also via MCP-server.
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Host EvoTestOps/LogLead in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.
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Claim this serverThe short answer
- Is LogLead safe to use?
- LogLead scores 80/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 11 of the 21 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
- How reliable is the security score for LogLead?
- We could evaluate 82% of the controls that apply to LogLead. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
- How was LogLead scored?
- Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Security controlslatest scored version vmain@29c501d
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Security controlslatest scored version vmain@29c501d
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails
- PassIn-Session Definition Integrityguardno call-gated or call-time tool definition changes
Tool and prompt definitions stay fixed during a session — they don't change after a few calls, which is how runtime-gated rug-pulls slip past one-time review.
- Not checkedIndirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno tools extracted
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
- Not checkedStrict JSON Schema Enforcementno tool schemas found
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
- Not checkedUser-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno tools extracted
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
- N/ATool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
Application Security Checks
- WarnNo dynamic code executionguard2 occurrences (build/test paths only)
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
demo/parser_benchmark/ano_detection.py:121demo/parser_benchmark/parsing_speed.py:79Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.
- WarnNo path traversalguard1 occurrence (build/test paths only)
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
demo/AutoLoader_samples.py:60Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
- WarnNo SSRF sinksguard1 occurrence
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
downloader/download_data.py:64Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
- WarnNo known-vulnerable dependencies2 of 113 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
[email protected] — GHSA-6fqq-452j-qhrp[email protected] — GHSA-v36g-jcw9-x7cw[email protected] — GHSA-42vr-xj54-vc7v[email protected] — GHSA-x33g-cr3x-6449Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.
- WarnHas a security policyno security policy
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.
- PassNo command-injection sinksguardno sinks found
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
- PassNo unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
- PassNo committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
- PassCredentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
- PassDependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
- PassActively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
- PassRepository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
- PassDeclares a licenseMIT
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
- PassAdoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
- Not checkedSigned releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
- N/ANo install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
- N/APackage name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
- N/APublished with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
- N/AEstablished maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Transport & Trust Model
- WarnExecution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.
- PassNetwork Exposureno bind-all detected
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
- N/ATransport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
- N/AIAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
- N/ANo Token Passthroughguardno HTTP transport
The client's token is never forwarded to downstream APIs — the server obtains its own, correctly-scoped credential instead.
- N/ADNS-Rebinding Protectionno HTTP transport
HTTP endpoints reject requests carrying an unlisted Origin, so a malicious web page can't drive the server through the user's browser.
- N/ALive Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
- N/AAuthentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.
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[](https://index.canopii.dev/server/EvoTestOps/LogLead)<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/EvoTestOps/LogLead"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/EvoTestOps/LogLead" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>Versions
| Version | Score | Status | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| vmain@29c501dlatest | 80B | scored | 10/9/2026 |
| vmain@ad70495 | 79B | scored | 10/6/2026 |
| vmain@aff97ac | 79B | scored | 10/5/2026 |
| vmain@90c8521 | 79B | scored | 10/1/2026 |
| vmain@d7a92d3 | 80B | scored | 9/30/2026 |
| vmain@901039f | 84B | scored | 9/29/2026 |
| vmain@e53df76 | 80B | scored | 9/24/2026 |
| vmain@9825e72 | 84B | scored | 9/23/2026 |
| vmain@005fd65 | 80B | scored | 9/22/2026 |
| vmain@bf5f1b8 | 80B | scored | 9/21/2026 |
| vmain@a8b94be | 80B | scored | 9/18/2026 |
| vmain@382a908 | 80B | scored | 9/17/2026 |
| vmain@532ca12 | 80B | scored | 9/14/2026 |
| vmain@c705d86 | 80B | scored | 9/13/2026 |
| vmain@2453cea | 80B | scored | 9/11/2026 |
| vmain@6e076a2 | 15F | scored | 9/11/2026 |
| vmain@3587605 | 15F | scored | 9/7/2026 |
Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.