Is ultimate_mcp_server safe to use?

ultimate_mcp_server scores 12/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 3 confirmed security failures that cap its score: No command-injection sinks, No dynamic code execution and No unsafe deserialization. It passes 9 of the 20 controls that apply to it.

What security issues does ultimate_mcp_server have?

ultimate_mcp_server fails 3 controls: No command-injection sinks, No dynamic code execution and No unsafe deserialization. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.

How reliable is the security score for ultimate_mcp_server?

We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to ultimate_mcp_server. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.

How was ultimate_mcp_server scored?

Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

ultimate_mcp_server MCP Server Security Report

Dicklesworthstone/ultimate_mcp_server

Comprehensive MCP server exposing dozens of capabilities to AI agents: multi-provider LLM delegation, browser automation, document processing, vector ops, and cognitive memory systems

12F

Security Trust Score

Grade F · Serious issues

Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest vmain@242e13a Repository

Declared MCP capabilities

Run it securely

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

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3 issues capping this score

criticalNo command-injection sinks — 1 occurrence
criticalNo dynamic code execution — 1 occurrence
highNo unsafe deserialization — 4 occurrences

The short answer

Is ultimate_mcp_server safe to use?: ultimate_mcp_server scores 12/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 3 confirmed security failures that cap its score: No command-injection sinks, No dynamic code execution and No unsafe deserialization. It passes 9 of the 20 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does ultimate_mcp_server have?: ultimate_mcp_server fails 3 controls: No command-injection sinks, No dynamic code execution and No unsafe deserialization. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for ultimate_mcp_server?: We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to ultimate_mcp_server. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was ultimate_mcp_server scored?: Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

Reputation157stars24forks0open issues44d agolast commit1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@242e13a

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

Warn
Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.
Pass
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
Pass
User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
N/A
Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

Fail
No command-injection sinksguard1 occurrence
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?
storage/smart_browser_internal/readability.js:1986
Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.
Fail
No dynamic code executionguard1 occurrence
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution. How many servers fail this?
ultimate_mcp_server/tools/meta_api_tool.py:552
Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.
Fail
No unsafe deserializationguard4 occurrences
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code. How many servers fail this?
ultimate_mcp_server/core/state_store.py:292ultimate_mcp_server/services/cache.py:81ultimate_mcp_server/services/cache/cache_service.py:736ultimate_mcp_server/services/cache/persistence.py:77
Fix: Use safe loaders (yaml.safe_load, JSON) on untrusted input.
Warn
No path traversalguard1 occurrence
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
storage/smart_browser_internal/readability.js:439
Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
Warn
No SSRF sinksguard1 occurrence
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
ultimate_mcp_server/tools/python_sandbox.py:330
Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
Warn
No known-vulnerable dependencies35 of 361 runtime deps vulnerable; worst critical
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
[email protected] — GHSA-2fqr-mr3j-6wp8[email protected] — GHSA-2vrm-gr82-f7m5[email protected] — GHSA-3wq7-rqq7-wx6j[email protected] — GHSA-4fvr-rgm6-gqmc
Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.
Warn
Declares a licenseno recognized license
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
Fix: Add a recognized SPDX license (MIT, Apache-2.0, …).
Warn
Has a security policyno security policy
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.
Pass
No committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
Pass
Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
Pass
Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Pass
Actively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
Pass
Repository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
Pass
Adoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
Not checked
Signed releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
N/A
No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
N/A
Package name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
N/A
Published with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
N/A
Established maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

Warn
Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.
Pass
Execution Sandboxingcontainerized
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
N/A
Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
N/A
IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
N/A
Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
N/A
Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

Version	Score	Status	Published
vmain@242e13alatest	12F	scored	6/26/2026

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.