AI-company MCP Server Security Report
Multi-agent team operating system for Claude Code. 108 MCP tools, 40+ agent templates, 10 lifecycle hooks, 7 pipeline workflows. Persistent teams, structured meetings, task wall, real-time React dashboard. No LangChain/AutoGen — pure CC native integration.
Run it securely
Host CronusL-1141/AI-company in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.
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Claim this serverThe short answer
- Is AI-company safe to use?
- AI-company scores 82/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 12 of the 20 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
- How reliable is the security score for AI-company?
- We could evaluate 81% of the controls that apply to AI-company. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
- How was AI-company scored?
- Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Security controlslatest scored version vmaster@2551bf1
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Security controlslatest scored version vmaster@2551bf1
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails
- Not checkedIndirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno tools extracted
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
- Not checkedStrict JSON Schema Enforcementno tool schemas found
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
- Not checkedUser-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno tools extracted
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
- N/ATool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
Application Security Checks
- WarnNo dynamic code executionguard4 occurrences (build/test paths only)
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
scripts/codex_adapter.py:53scripts/codex_adapter.py:66scripts/codex_adapter.py:85scripts/codex_runtime.py:42Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.
- WarnNo path traversalguard27 occurrences
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
dashboard/src/api/client.ts:91dashboard/src/api/notices.ts:70dashboard/src/components/ecosystem/ScanHistoryTimeline.tsx:52dashboard/src/components/ecosystem/ScanHistoryTimeline.tsx:81Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
- WarnNo SSRF sinksguard26 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
dashboard/src/api/client.ts:99plugin/harness/codex/hooks/channel_unread_codex.py:121plugin/harness/codex/hooks/codex_completion_delivery.py:86plugin/harness/codex/hooks/hook_core.py:744Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
- WarnNo known-vulnerable dependencies24 of 465 runtime deps vulnerable; worst critical
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
@babel/[email protected] — GHSA-4x5r-pxfx-6jf8@hono/[email protected] — GHSA-92pp-h63x-v22m@hono/[email protected] — GHSA-frvp-7c67-39w9@modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] — GHSA-22jm-h49p-29qwFix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.
- PassNo command-injection sinksguardno sinks found
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
- PassNo unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
- PassNo committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
- PassCredentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
- PassDependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
- PassActively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
- PassRepository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
- PassDeclares a licenseMIT
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
- PassHas a security policySECURITY.md present
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
- PassAdoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
- Not checkedSigned releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
- N/ANo install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
- N/APackage name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
- N/APublished with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
- N/AEstablished maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Transport & Trust Model
- PassExecution Sandboxingcontainerized
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
- PassNetwork Exposureno bind-all detected
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
- N/ATransport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
- N/AIAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
- N/ALive Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
- N/AAuthentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.
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[](https://index.canopii.dev/server/CronusL-1141/AI-company)<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/CronusL-1141/AI-company"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/CronusL-1141/AI-company" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>Versions
| Version | Score | Status | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| vmaster@2551bf1latest | 82B | scored | 10/27/2026 |
| vmaster@01ae582 | 82B | scored | 10/11/2026 |
| vmaster@3275b8a | 82B | scored | 10/10/2026 |
| vmaster@774c341 | 83B | scored | 9/30/2026 |
| vmaster@329c525 | 86B | scored | 9/20/2026 |
| vmaster@dd60e97 | 86B | scored | 9/18/2026 |
| vmaster@3f4d9ab | 86B | scored | 9/14/2026 |
| vmaster@bee462d | 86B | scored | 9/11/2026 |
| vmaster@0725b6c | 86B | scored | 9/9/2026 |
| vmaster@f782a2b | 86B | scored | 8/14/2026 |
| vmaster@d66a3c5 | 85B | scored | 8/3/2026 |
Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.