CanopiiCanopiiAll serversEnterprise →

agent MCP Server Security Report

1mcp-app/agent

A unified Model Context Protocol server implementation that aggregates multiple MCP servers into one.

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 90%latest vmain@08ab170 Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

Host 1mcp-app/agent in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

Are you the maintainer?

Verify with GitHub to get alerted whenever 1mcp-app/agent changes score — and claim the badge for your README.

Claim this server

The short answer

Is agent safe to use?
agent scores 87/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 15 of the 21 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for agent?
We could evaluate 90% of the controls that apply to agent. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was agent scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation529stars71forks16open issues2d agolast commit2yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@08ab170

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No command-injection sinksguard3 occurrences (build/test paths only)

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

    scripts/build-binary.cjs:100scripts/build-sea.cjs:83scripts/update-version.cjs:38

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard63 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    docs/site/.vitepress/config/index.ts:170examples/backend-preparation/native-fixture-command.mjs:51examples/backend-preparation/native-fixture-command.mjs:52examples/backend-preparation/native-fixture-command.mjs:80

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard32 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    scripts/release-publications.cjs:20scripts/security/inbound-credential-store-smoke.mjs:142scripts/security/inbound-credential-store-smoke.mjs:298scripts/security/inbound-credential-store-smoke.mjs:329

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseApache-2.0

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Embed this score

Add the live badge to your README — it updates automatically on every rescan.

Canopii Trust Score badge preview
markdown[![Canopii Trust Score](https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/1mcp-app/agent)](https://index.canopii.dev/server/1mcp-app/agent)
html<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/1mcp-app/agent"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/1mcp-app/agent" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>

Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@08ab170latest87Bscored
vmain@a9b54d687Bscored
vmain@840eebe87Bscored
vmain@559c38e87Bscored
vmain@f80ebfc87Bscored
vmain@0febf9187Bscored
vmain@f43a1fa87Bscored
vmain@c3f8fd087Bscored
vmain@1284e1c87Bscored
vmain@c834d1a87Bscored
vmain@c405d2887Bscored
vmain@157c9c787Bscored
vmain@df6863f87Bscored
vmain@020c2f187Bscored
vmain@05e83df87Bscored
vmain@58c772887Bscored
vmain@7eabc5087Bscored
vmain@13fb62687Bscored
vmain@8a4091b87Bscored
vmain@19ce30184Bscored
vmain@0efa38684Bscored
vmain@14bde7584Bscored
vmain@eae4fca84Bscored
vmain@6775c0f84Bscored
vmain@76501d284Bscored
vmain@bf68e9584Bscored
vmain@ee60b3b84Bscored
vmain@5c6c4b584Bscored
vmain@c147b0784Bscored
vmain@49abde484Bscored
vmain@e9fa63b83Bscored
vmain@29247be84Bscored
vmain@4148a7784Bscored
vmain@50af86084Bscored
vmain@3dc5aca84Bscored
vmain@906cd4984Bscored
vmain@013ee9184Bscored
vmain@838aa1e84Bscored
vmain@32efdbc84Bscored
vmain@3f95e3f84Bscored
vmain@a93600484Bscored
vmain@f02c60383Bscored
vmain@dce226a84Bscored
vmain@5e5dd2284Bscored
vmain@2bb30bb84Bscored
vmain@7933d7884Bscored
vmain@d7bde4b84Bscored
vmain@0a6426584Bscored
vmain@13cd33a84Bscored
vmain@15ee1e884Bscored
vmain@f78f65416Fscored
vmain@76b2ccd82Bscored
vmain@71e643b82Bscored
vmain@54ce01a81Bscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.